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ABSTRACT

It has been claimed by some in creationist circles that modern physics is derived from a priori atheistic
reductionistic presuppositions. On the contrary, it is claimed in this paper that it is possible to construct
a Christian theistic interpretation of the experimental facts which is consistent with the Biblical doctrines
of man, creation, revelation, and God. This reconciliation is derived by the correct method which
subordinates "scientific" interpretation to the authority of special revelation. It is also demonstrated that
some of the presuppositions and arguments of creationists against theories such as quantum mechanics
and relativity actually exhibit anti-theistic philosophies (Thomism and Arminianism) or fundamental
misunderstandings of these theories. A Christian theistic view of the phenomena and theories of moderr
physics is presented.
INTRODUCTION

This essay is a modest attempt to advance and articulate the Christian theistic worldview, especially in
regard to the philosophy of science in the areas of probability and quantum mechanics. To some extent
the issues and views presented here have been, to varying degrees, already expounded by others. (See,
e.g. Worthing [43] . A detailed discussion of points of disagreement with these authors would extend the
current essay far beyond its intended scope.) As a result, this essay will be essentially a review of some
prior results and a critique of other views. I will present some suggestions regarding the direction to take
for a final solution and to advance the discussion of these issues.
Inasmuch as quantum mechanics is an explicitly probabilistic theory, the need for a preliminary
development of a Christian theistic view of what might be termed the "classical" probability theory is
essential. These theories, "classical" probability and quantum mechanics, will be established within the
Christian ontology and epistemology. The Biblical basis of Christian ontology and epistemology is
assumed throughout this essay and will be briefly described as background for the remainder of the
essay. The apologetic methodology is presuppositional.

PART I: THE CHRISTIAN THEISTIC VIEW OF PROBABILITY THEORY
CHRISTIAN THEISTIC VIEW OF GOD, MAN, KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENCE

As mentioned previously, the methodology of this essay is presuppositional, and - except for a few brief
introductory remarks to follow - will be used without extensive elaboration. In this section I will also give
a brief foundation of the Christian theistic epistemology which will set the framework for the explanations
of classical probability theory and quantum mechanics. Readers unfamiliar with the presuppositional
apologetic method or the theistic foundations of human knowledge should refer to the works by Cornelius
Van Til [38].[39].[40].[41]. Greg Bahnsen [1]. and John Frame [14],[15] for a comprehensive exposition.
Christian theistic doctrine of creation

Central to Christian theism is the revealed doctrine of God, as Creator, and the relation of this doctrine
to man and epistemology, or Christian theory of knowledge. The creation account in Genesis presents
God as creating the space-time continuum and the material creation ex nihilo. When we speak of creation
ex nihilo, we are intent on denying the dualist notion of reality that God merely formed the creation out
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of eternally coexisting material possessing inherent preexistent properties. God established the laws of
the material universe by Divine fiat. The Genesis account also relates the beginning of time, as indicated
by the phrase "and the evening and the morning were the first day." Since God has created time, He is
"above" time. These special revelations are the theistic, Biblically based foundation of the Christian
philosophy of reality and theory of knowledge. The Biblical doctrines of God's transcendence and
immanence are opposed, respectively, to the anti-theistic philosophies of pantheism and deism. God is
transcendent: He is beyond the creation and other than the creation; He is not dependent on the creation.
God is also immanent: He providentially maintains and works within the creation; the creation is totally
dependent upon God. God is the ultimate cause of all space-time factuality, and all such factuality is
according to His comprehensive and all-encompassing plan. Herman Bavinck [2, p.55] gives a succinct
summary :
In the order of being, God is undoubtedly first. He is Creator and Preserver of all things.
His thought and knowledge precedes the coming into existence of things. We are not to
suppose that the world was first called into being, and that, as a result of this, God afterward
learned to know it.
Since God is the ultimate cause of everything in creation, each event has its particular meaning and
purpose because God, the root of all truth, has established it within His overarching plan; consequently,
there is no ultimate contingency. This foundational theology revealed in Genesis is, of course, in stark
contrast to the pagan philosophies which contain a plurality of equally ultimate gods, men, and things,
ruled over by "reified" Chance.
Also, the Scripture speaks of God having created man "in His image," which includes an immaterial
spiritual component; and that man was endowed with a rationality derivative from and analogical to God's
rationality. It is in this sense that man is the imago Dei; man's rationality is a finite replica of God's
rationality. The presuppositional approach seeks to take seriously and to remain true to the revealed
doctrine of creation and God the Creator. The theistic doctrine of creation implies that limited, yet true,
knowledge is available to man. Again, God is the source of and the root of all truth, and His revelation
to man, both special (verbal) and general (natural), is true but not exhaustive. True knowledge is possible
for man because God, as the source of all, is the ultimate subject of all predication. Man, in response
to God's revelation, is to 'think God's thoughts after Him."
Furthermore, God communicates to man in accordance with man's created finite capacity. Consequently,
it is in the nature of the case that all of man's knowledge is thus finite, creaturely and, to varying degrees,
an idealization. This must also be so in regard to the Scriptures - and this does not diminish the
doctrine of the perspicuity of Scripture. The Scriptures are written in language created by God in order
to communicate truth to man. When language expresses truths about God's being and His attributes in
finite terms, it is necessarily anthropomorphic and, therefore, necessarily an idealization. Examples of
anthropomorphic expressions in the Scriptures are well known and could be quoted extensively.
Since man's knowledge is derivative or analogical, it is necessarily an idealization, for only God himself
knows all exhaustively. Man cannot - nor ever will - plumb the depths of reality (i.e. God and His
creation) at anyone pOint. There always will be inscrutable aspects of the creation. For example, man
can study an electron and, due to the rationality implanted in him by his Creator, truly know various
aspects of the nature and makeup of the electron. But only God himself knows exhaustively - not only
the design of the electron, but also each electron's place and purpose within God's plan.
Thus, we see that the creation account provides the first articulation of the Christian ontology and
epistemology, which in summary is as follows: What "exists" is God the Creator and His creation. God
is independent of the creation, and the creation is totally dependent upon God as creator and sustainer
(Col. 1:17). God's knowledge is exhaustive ; man can attain to true knowledge but it is always incomplete.
These facts constitute a portion of the Creator/creature distinction. This distinction is the fundamental and
true dualism; it is opposed to anti-theistic dualism. We again see that the Biblical doctrine of creation is
absolutely foundational to the Christian philosophy of men and things.
Christian theism and the philosophy of science

This section will conclude with a somewhat abbreviated discussion of the Christian theistic epistemology
as the foundation of science.
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Any philosophy of science must include, among its presuppositions, a methodology of science and a
philosophy of facts. A bare, naive empiricism is untenable - it offers no intelligible explanation for the
existence of rationality in the universe, or for intelligibility, in general. The methodology of science must
include an epistemology and criteria by which truth claims are justified. Christian theism alone offers an
intelligible and coherent framework for understanding the existence of knowledge, in general, and for
justifying the hypothetical-deductive method (the latter understood in the Christian sense); the converse
is that unless Christian theism is true, there is no truth or rationality. Yet within Christian theism - as
revealed by special revelation - we know that man's knowledge must always be (1) limited, i.e. nonexhaustive; yet (2) true, since man's knowledge is a finite derivative (or analog) of God's exhaustive
knowledge. These points - in anticipation of the later discussion on the implications of quantum
mechanics - need to be underscored, since quantum mechanics demonstrates that there is, in principle,
not just in practice, a boundary to man's knowledge beyond which lies mystery. This conclusion from
the quantum mechanical formalism is consonant with the Biblical data on the nature of man. Van Til [41,
p.24] summarizes these points as follows :
Before the world was, God existed alone. In him, existence and interpretation are coextensive. The Spirit of God searches the deep things of God. It follows from this that any
human interpreters would have to be derivative interpreters or re-interpreters.
The interpretation that man would give to anything in this world can therefore never be
comprehensive and exhaustive. This much of truth there is in the recent emphasis on the
part of the men of science on the mysteriousness of the facts of the universe. However, as
Christians, we hold that the reason for the mysteriousness of the facts of the universe is not
given by scientists today. Science today, in consonance with non-Christian thought in
general, holds that the facts of the universe are surrounded by an ultimate void, that is, by
an ultimate irrationality. We, on the contrary, hold that God as absolute Light is back of the
facts of the universe. We hold that the atom is mysterious for us, but not for God.
Van Til goes on to correctly point out that the non-Christian scientist does, in fact, have a religion - when
he sees the atom surrounded by mystery, "he worships the void." We, on the other hand, as Christians
and sCientists, worship God when confronted with this mystery. Again, Van Til summarizes, "As Christians,
then, we believe that human knowledge of the world and of God is (a) not exhaustive and yet (b) true."
This is so because we are created in God's image. Since we are created, our knowledge must be finite,
limited, and non-exhaustive. Yet, since we are created in the image of God, the limited knowledge we
have is true.
Special and general revelation and the philosophy of science

The central truth which the presuppositional apologetic method intends to defend is that all areas of man's
knowledge are to be subordinated to and judged by the self-attesting authority of God and His revelation
to man - both special and general. Presuppositionalism rejects - without qualification - the premise
of unbelieving thought that there are "neutral areas of fact and knowledge" that are outside the sphere of
theology. This idea has been termed the 'myth of neutrality.' There are no "brute" facts; no '1act" can be
rationally understood independently of God. Another way of stating this is that it is impossible to discuss
science or any area of knowledge without bringing God into the picture', and then later, as a kind of
afterthought, discuss the "possibility of God's existence." Thus, consistent theism rejects a neutral
"naturalism" as if any fact could exist without God behind it. Consequently, there is no division in
knowledge between so-called "scientific" facts and "non-scientific" facts. Such phrases as "scientific facts"
and "scientifically proven" are misrepresentations. Van Til [39, p.175] summarizes as follows:
Believers can objectively show to unbelievers that the unity of science can be attained only
on the Christian theistic basis. It is the idea of God controlling whatsoever comes to pass
that forms the foundation of science. And no one can or does believe that idea unless by
the sovereign grace of God through Christ he has repented of his sin. Thus it is Christianity
that furnishes the basis of the structure of science.
We can summarize the basics of the presuppositional apologetic as it relates to the philosophy of science
in the following way. First, the foundation of all knowledge is the self-attesting God of the Scriptures, and,
as such, Scripture (understood by the normative hermeneutic~ is the gauge of all science, never the
reverse. The self-contained God, who has revealed himself in Scripture and nature, is the sole basis for
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all knowledge and predication. Man, as God's finite creation, can know truly but not exhaustively.
Second, in light of these observations, there is only one method to be applied in all fields of inquiry.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF ANTI-THEISTIC ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY: THOMISTIC AND
ARMIN IAN
In contrast to theistic epistemology and the presuppositional apologetic, we have the more or less antitheistic Thomistic (as espoused by Romanism) and Arminian views of God, man, and knowledge. Again,
the survey here must be very brief, and I refer the reader to the previously mentioned works by Van Til,
Bahnsen, and Frame for a complete discussion.
The Thomistic view, in contradistinction to theism, is based not upon Scripture, but rather upon
autonomous man. This is a natural consequence of its infection by pagan philosophies of truth, especially
that of Aristotle as embraced by Scholasticism. The main ingredients of Thomistic thought are as follows :
First, both God and man participate jointly in "being in general." "Being" is an abstract principle. God is
thus correlative to man and creation in general, as both God and man are contained in a "greater reality."
God is "open" and subject to "chance," inasmuch as it lies in the power of man to determine the future
independently of God. As a result, God is also dependent on the creation. Thomism thus has a defective
view of the ontological Trinity. Second, in the realm of epistemology, Thomism embraces a dualistic
notion of knowledge. There are two "orders" of knowledge: the order of reason and the order of faith .
Thomism accepts the pagan notion of exhaustive knowledge to man in the natural realm. To this extent
it embraces rationalism, in that it accords to man the power to ascend to truth solely with the intellect via
abstract prinCiples - principles that exist apart from God. Yet, in the realm of ''faith,'' Thomism denies
the ability of the rationality of man; and to this extent embraces irrational fideism. In terms of
methodology, this philosophy results in a false dichotomy of methods: a "scientific method" applicable to
"scientific" questions, and a distinct 'theological method" applicable to 'theological" questions.
To a large degree the Arminian view coincides with the Thomistic view, though it does render a more
consistent view of Scripture than that of Thomism. It, too, accepts the notion of autonomous man who
can bring about the truly new apart from and outside of the plan of God. This is because Arminianism
embraces the axiom that in order for man to be ''free,'' he must be able to do that which is outside of the
plan (or decrees) of God, i.e. man is able to thwart God. Arminianism - in the same way as Thomism
and pagan philosophy - places "possibility' above God. Also, in the realm of epistemology, Arminianism
consents to the notion that man can attain to exhaustive knowledge of the creation. Man is autonomous
in all respects; both in action and thought, man is ultimate. Arminianism leans toward a naturalism in the
material realm and appeals to abstract principles independent of Scripture.
As briefly commented upon above, contained in this "naturalism," borrowed from pagan philosophy, is the
idea that the material universe can be understood apart from God and without bringing into the picture the
self-existent God. It is ironic that on this point the atheist and the anti-theist share common ground even though they are motivated by entirely different presuppositions. The atheist builds his worldview on
the belief that there is no God, while the anti-theist builds his on the belief of autonomous man. The
atheist searches for exhaustive explanation since he believes the laws of nature can be rationally
understood precisely because there is no God. For the anti-theist, on the other hand, it follows that if
nature can be understood apart from God, it must be understood exhaustively. Otherwise, there would
be an "irrational" residue of the physical universe which would be "beyond" God; and, if this were so, this
material ''void'' would be shrouded in ultimate Mystery beyond the knowledge of God and of man. In
consequence, the "natural" realm is viewed as completely self-determining via natural laws which can be
exhaustively and empirically discovered by the law of induction. So, both the atheist and the anti-theist
are driven by a desire to discover exhaustive knowledge of the natural universe.
Bahnsen [1 p.229] summarizes this "naturalism" of Deism, Thomism and Arminianism, as follows:
The religious version of this notion [the Greek philosophy of eternal impersonal laws] that
there are "laws of nature" postulates a personal God as the origin of the material world and
of the causal principles by which it operates, but this God (and the free or arbitrary exercise
of His almighty will) is nevertheless "separated" from the ordinary and ongoing workings of
the world He made. God has chosen not to directly govern every detail in the created world
on a moment by moment baSiS, and thus "nature" has laws inherent in it which determine
what things are like and how things happen. Variations on this conception of God's world
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as governed by impersonal natural laws are found in a wide range of Christian professions,
from Deism to Thomism (Roman Catholicism) to evangelical Arminianism.
The anti-theistic view is self-defeating. The atheist will point out that ". . . if you start with the idea of cause
and purpose as intelligible to man without God when these concepts apply to relations within the universe,
then you cannot consistently say that you need God for the idea of cause or purpose when these
concepts apply to the universe as a whole." [39, p.252]. The ironic consequence of this position is that
the anti-theist is indeed left with a "God of the gaps." Further, there are no gaps which remain in the selfdetermining natural realm for God to fill. God maintains a "hands off' policy until He decides to perform
a miracle to correct some defect in the creation. But the atheist will respond to the anti-theist that an
appeal to miracles is "cheating," for it does not conform to the "scientific method." The anti-theist, in
response to this charge, retreats behind the defense of his idea of two ways of knowledge. Science is
good and well in the natural realm, but it cannot apply in the realm of faith.
In closing, it should be noted that the end result of compromising God's declaration concerning Himself
and his creation results in inconsistent theology, and those who have felt the inconsistency have
descended into a full return to paganism as manifested in "process theology" and the "open God"
worldviews (cf. e.g. Pinnock et al. [27]) . Deism, in that it denies special revelation, asserts that man
resides in an "absent landlord" universe. Man is in charge of everything and ascends to ''truth'' by his own
"enlightened" mind; God becomes a mere spectator. Thomism and Arminianism likewise compromise the
Biblical doctrine of creation and make God dependent upon the contingent events in creation. However,
the Biblical declaration is that God is not a mere spectator of "contingent possible events" transpiring
beyond His will in an independent creation ruled by "probabilities." We thus need to turn to God's own
testimony regarding "probability."
PROBABILITY: THE BIBLICAL DECLARATION

The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the LORD. Proverbs 16:33
This oft-quoted verse is central to the topic of this essay, and is the definitive Scriptural declaration of the
absence of ultimate contingency in the creation. Any consistent Christian theistic articulation of probability
theory must ascribe, at the outset, to the non-existence of "random" sequences. God is the source of all
"possibility." The further inference is that probability is an issue of limited creature knowledge. This verse
also refutes the deistic notion that God is merely a prescient observer of the creation, for it declares God's
providential activity even in the case of die rolls (the model of probability systems which introduces all
students to the study of probability theory) .
In anti-theistic worldviews, the result of a die toss is under the control of impersonal chance events acting
under the impersonal laws of nature; the die roll is something that can transpire outside the plan of God.
To the theist, nothing is outside the plan of God; there are no impersonal "chance" events in the spatiotemporal realm ; rather, all events speak of the personality of God. God acting via the intermediary laws
of physics is a personal act - the laws are what they are by the will of God. In view of the Biblical
testimony, we ought then to regard any set of die rolls (even in an unimportant game of Yahtzee). not as
an impersonal act of impersonal forces, but the personal act of our sovereign Lord.
Two important testimonies from Scripture show men casting lots in order to discover God's choice; the
choosing of Saul in 1 Sam. 10:20-21, and the selection of Matthias as the replacement for Judas in Acts

1:26".
In addition to Provo 16:33, there are numerous other passages which declare God's providential and
sovereign governing of the whole created realm . Time does not allow these to be covered here in depth;
however, the following passages are especially pertinent to the discussion at hand.
Job 14:16 declares that God determines (numbers) Job's steps, while in Matt. 10:29-31 , even the sparrows
lives are determined by God and our hairs are determined (numbered). Also, James 4:13-15 says that
all we plan to do can come about only if God, who has numbered our days, sustains our lives another
day. Provo21: 1 declares that the "king's heart is as channels of water," and that God turns it as He wills.
Eph. 1:11 states, "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the
purpose of him who works all things after the decree of his own desire" (Greek Text); so that all things
are decreed according to God's wishes'. Finally, Rev. 4:11 unequivocally states that all things were
created and exist according to God's pleasure. Whether or not we like to admit it, this verse includes,
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within God's decretive will, the presence of sin in the creation, Satan and his fallen angels, and all the lost
of humankind 5 . These verses give sufficient breadth and show that all of creation is ordered according
to God's decree: This includes both the inanimate and animate, and the affairs of men's hearts as
articulated in the doctrines of sovereign grace (cf. Rom. 9:13,16-21, for one). No part of creation comes
about independently from God's decretive will. This doctrine is clearly summarized in the Westminster
Confession of Faith, Chapter III - Of God's Eternal Decree.
PHILOSOPHIES OF PROBABILITY AND CHANCE

Having presented God's self-attesting declaration in Scripture that no part of reality is governed by
"chance" or "probabilities," we now proceed to the evaluation of several philosophies of probability theory.
The goal of this section is to revisit the well-known and insoluble difficulties of the anti-theistic philosophies
of probability and then to articulate the Christian theistic foundations of probability theory.
What is meant by the word "random?"

The key ingredient expressed by the idea of "random" is indeterminism. Popper [28, p.150] describes
randomness as events which are characterized by the perception that it would take a prophet to predict
the outcomes. 'We have as it were, the feeling that not a scientist but only a prophet could predict them ,"·
or, that it has a certain "lawless" character. The character of the indeterminism - whether the
randomness is related to limited knowledge (of otherwise determinate events) or intrinsic to nature - is
the core of the debate between subjectivist and objectivist theories of probability to be discussed later.
Anticipating later results, note that the debate makes a false dichotomy between the epistemological and
the objective components of "random." The issue is solved in the theistic worldview by realizing the
following : (1) There is simultaneously a creaturely limit to both knowledge (subjective aspect) and control
(objective aspect) of the physical universe; and (2) As Scripture attests, there is no ultimate (absolute)
probability, for God is the sufficient cause of all things.
As far as technical definitions of random sequences, we can consider the following developments.
Richard von Mises [23], who was a radical empiricist and a logical positivist, attempted a synthetic theory
of random events. Von Mises' idea of a random sequence was based on the idea of the "collective." The
collective is an infinite sequence of values
(1)
S - X"~ " "'Xn' "
whose values cannot be computed as a function of n (Le. are "anomalous"), and such that for eve!}' subsequence (such that the selection of members to retain did not depend on the value of x,,) is also
"anomalous." For example, in the toss of a fair coin, heads appears with a frequency of 0.5 in the original
sequence. Also, heads appears half the time in the sequence obtained by considering only the odd
tosses and in the sequence obtained by considering every third toss, etc. This characterization is based
on the intuitive concept of "non-existence of successful gambling systems." Such sequences have the
property that they automatically reproduce the "law of large numbers," Le. the frequency of occurrences
of events approaches the probability in the limit of infinite sequences. Stated conversely, von Mises'
theory excludes every "lawful" sequence from the class of random sequences. Hence, any sequence
which can be generated algorithmically is "non-random." This would include, for example, the sequence
of decimal digits of transcendental numbers such as 1t, or the output of a deterministic chaotic system.
Later developments by Doob, Copeland, and Church showed that von Mises' idea of a collective was too
strong, and that no such sequences could be constructed. See, for example, Popper's discussion of this
point [3~, p.361 sequens, and footnote (7) on p.362]. The idea which remedies the contradiction in Von
Mises' original idea of the collective is the notion of the "effectively" random sequence. These are
sequences which, although deterministic, cannot be predicted because there is no effectively (Le.
knowable) computable algorithm to determine the generating function.
Another attempt to give a consistent "definition" of random is Kolmogorov's "complexity" definition. In this
characterization, a random sequence is one which cannot be "encoded" in fewer "bits" than the string
itself. In this notion, a random string is one that can be described only by printing the string . This
definition drives home the fact that in the anti-theistic worldview, everything is really only anecdotal.
These technical definitions, though they can contribute to understanding the issues, are merely
descriptive; they offer no explanatory power.
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Remarks on empirical and singular "probabilities·

The technical meaning of probability refers to the assignment of a numerical value which expresses the
relative likelihood of an event in a "random" sequence or set. This is expressed mathematically as
N

P{x) - lim.!

L Xi

N--N I_1

(2)

where X; is an indicator function which is 1 if the ith trial is a success for event "x" and 0 otherwise. In other
words, p(x) is the frequency of occurrence of event "x." If we examine the technical and philosophical
underpinnings of assigning numerical values to likelihoods of events, and examine the technical uses of
these terms - analyzed to the limit of human understanding - we can then discover the anti-theistic
biases of modern science. One of the goals of anti-theistic probability theory is to analyze the concepts
of probability or chance to discover whether they are an irreducible something "in the world" or whether
they are reducible to something else "in the world." The question is: "How does the limit of the observed
frequency approach a fixed value?" The subjectivist view - which comes closest to the correct theistic
view - roots "probability" in the ignorance of the observer. In this view, "random" comes close to the idea
of "uncontrollability." For example, in a "chaotic" deterministic system, "outcomes" are widely separated
even though initial conditions can be arbitrarily close. In this case the absence of control in practice gives
rise to the dispersion of outcomes.
Empirically, probabilities can only be computed statistically as in equation (2), and this means that only
frequencies of events - all other things being equal - can be assigned a meaningful value. Singular
probabilities are meaningless. How do we assign a probability to the event that a specific individual, for
example a 40-year-old non-smoking male named John Doe, lives to the age of 45? On the basis of
actuarial charts, we can estimate that within a group of such individuals a certain percentage will live to
be 45 - but what does this say about John Doe? What is the singular probability that John Doe will live
to be 45? Clearly, statistical averages cannot be applied to a single individual.
Popper points out that formally singular probability statements (such as "the probability that the next roll
of a die is 6 = 1/6") can never be falsified, (see Popper [28 p.228]). To clarify this, consider the toss of
the mythological fair coin. We say that the probability that heads or tails will occur on the next toss is
one-half. Yet when we actually toss the coin, it must land heads or tails. So, what does that say about
the so-called objective probability for that specific toss? Further, in the frequentist view, no finite string
of random flips of a coin can be used to decide that a coin is biased. In the frequentist view - that
probabilities are the limits of frequencies of events when the length of the sequence approaches infinity
- no finite string contributes to the limit! Or, paradoxically, all of the probability always "resides in the
results of the infinite tail"! This observation is also the core of the problem of induction, namely, "How can
any finite sequence of observations be infallibly generalized to a universal statement?" Consider, for
example, the "fair" coin whose first hundred tosses turn up "heads" but thereafter are "random" (i.e. the
results reproduce the correct frequency limits). According to statistical tests the coin would be adjudged
to be "biased" based solely upon the first hundred rolls, yet the frequentist interpretation declares this
sequence "random." These remarks point to the fundamental problem of the anti-theistic philosophies to
make a convincing connection between the empirical observations of frequencies and a putative
"objective" probability.
When we turn to modern philosophies of probability, we find that they can generally be categorized as
to whether they view probability and chance as an issue of epistemology or ontology. In the ontological
view, chance is something ultimate and objectively "in the world." In the epistemological category, the
theories can be further subdivided into a subjectivist and objectivist point of view. But before discussing
these philosophical viewpoints I will briefly deal with the formal or axiomatic theory of probability.
Kolmogorov axiomatic theory of probability

Kolmogorov's axiomatic approach is the usual flavor of probability taught in introductory probability
classes. This axiomatization, however, only defines the mathematical properties which "probability" must
satisfy. It offers no philosophical view on how or from whence the probability measure on the field of
events arises; nor does it supply a formalism for constructing such spaces. These structures are assumed
as "givens." They are a priori abstract entities much the same as the concept of a point in the Euclidean
axiomatization of plane geometry. The construction of the a-field of events ("possibilia") and the measure
1.1. ("likelihoods") is left to empirical, philosophical, and physical enquiry. It can be shown that the axiomatic
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approach recovers the frequency interpretation, but only when the idea of "selection at random" of events
can be performed according to the relative frequency specified by J.L. This is clearly an invalid circular
definition. The measure per se is supposed to provide an axiomatic idea of probability (or randomness),
yet the measure J.L only describes a relative frequency, which describes observed proportions of events
as they occur - it does not, nor can it, provide a more precise idea of randomness. Another point is that
the Kolmogorov axioms, in actuality, reduce probability theory to set theory and the theory of measures
on these sets.
As to the problem of assigning measures to sets, we are confronted with the following problems: (1)
specifying the universal set Q (always within a limited context); (2) specifying predication on Q; and (3)
setting up the "a priori" probabilities or measure. In the most trivial of cases - such as die roll
experiments - specifying these quantities is not difficult or usually liable to much controversy. But on
larger more "universal" statements, such as "degree of confirmation" of theories or the likelihood of
"spontaneous generation of life from lifeless matter," the methodology of constructing such probabilities
will, ab initio, place one either on theistic or anti-theistic ground. This is because the very process of
delineating possibilia is dependent upon a person's worldview. As Van Til [40, p.107] states:
When one defines possibility he ipso facto defines reality. When one opens his mouth about
possibility he also opens his mouth about God. God is either the source of possibility or he
comes out of bare possibility, or for that matter any other term would have no significance
if God were not back of it as the final subject of predication.
And elsewhere [41, p.38]:
On the question of possibility, the same difference of opinion exists that we found on the
matter of predication in general. For the theist, possibility has its source in God, while for
the anti-theist, God has His source in possibility. Hence, what one will deem most possible,
the other will consider altogether impossible.
The question is similar with respect to the matter of probability. For theism God's plan is
back of what is probable. For anti-theism, the probable is independent of God. Hence,
what one thinks altogether probable, the other will think altogether improbable because
altogether impossible.
The epistemological views

In the epistemological view, probability is a theoretical term which is connected to our degree of
knowledge. The subjectivist version is that probabilities are only a property of "something in our minds,"
and not an objective property; while the objectivist version grants that there are objective things "outside
of our minds," and thus there are criteria for assigning measures to outcomes, usually based on physical
and symmetry considerations.
The extreme and, in fact, deistic viewpoint is that the material universe is deterministic and that probability
relates solely to our lack of detailed knowledge of the initial conditions which enter into a specific solution
of the Hamiltonian equations of motion. Laplace expresses this crypto-determinism view in his oftenquoted statement [21, p.4] :
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state
and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instance an intelligence which
could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation
of the beings who compose it - an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit data to analysis
- it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the
universe and those of the lightest atom; for it nothing would be uncertain and the future, as
the past, would be present to its eyes.
According to Laplace's view of the universe, only those things decreed by Mathematics take place, and
anything disallowed is forever impossible. The Laplacian view, as further developed in the causal
determinism of Newtonian mechanics, is that initial conditions plus exact laws of propagation yield history
for all time. In symbols:
(3)
{X(O). ~}-X(t) .
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The deduction proceeds both ways. Given exhaustive knowledge of the history of X, we can deduce the
law (assuming that the laws are expressible as differential equations of arbitrary but finite order); or, given
the law and the initial conditions (expressible in terms of initial positions and time derivatives up to order
n-1, where n is the order of the differential equation), Laplace's "Great Mathematician" can reconstruct the
entire history. Reality is just a differential equation.
Elaborating on this view further, it claims that all of material nature is deterministic, and there is an
exhaustive immanent description within the physical universe, described via a differential equation

~~

- F(X,t) ,

(4)

where X is a complete set of state variables, and all other quantities and qualities are reducible to
functions of X. Given X at 10 we know X for all time, and thus also all derived quantities? Note the form
of the equation includes the Hamiltonian formulation if X = (q,p) and F = {X,H(q,p,t)}. The Hamiltonian
flow is non-linear and exhibits "chaotic" behavior, which places limits on man's ability to predict the
outcome; and it is in this sense that things appear random . Nevertheless, each trajectory in phase space
can be labeled by its initial conditions. If we assign a probability density for the initial conditions, then this
density evolves according to the Liouville equation. This formalism corresponds to the "probability as
ignorance" view which forms the basis of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and classical
thermodynamics. The use of a probability density in this case is useful for limiting the amount of data
required to model the average aggregate properties, such as temperature and pressure, without solving
the n-body problem systems composed of molar collections of particles. Such an approach is also useful
in the case of highly chaotic systems involving relatively small numbers of particles when measurement
of the initial conditions is of limited precision.
Since each trajectory can always be labeled by its initial condition, this means that as we trace back in
time along a trajectory corresponding to a coin toss of "heads," each event along that trajectory is both
determined and always labeled "heads." Conversely, the event "heads" is just the terminal event in a long
chain of events stretching back into the remote past. Of course the actual picture is more complicated
than this simple description. The coin is actually an assemblage of atoms, and according to the material
determinist view, a particular result of the coin toss was determined even before the atoms of the coin
were assembled into a coin. A similar remark holds for a coin which lands ''tails.'' Thus, the space of all
trajectories is divided into disjoint equivalence classes which correspond to the mechanistically
predestined outcomes. However, in this view there must be an initial asymmetric selection of the
equivalence class in which the terminal result began its existence. This asymmetry is unaccounted for.
As the coin toss is traced back in time, there is an initial "selection" which is "rooted in ultimate chaos and
irrationality." So, as is typical of anti-theistic thought, even though this view appears to be "rational," the
determinism is ultimately "irrational" since the initial conditions just "spring out of nothing ." This admission
of an initial indeterminism is the Achilles heel of the determinist philosophy. The empirical determinist,
having allowed chaos to get one foot in the door of his house, will find it hard to refuse the admission of
Chaos to his living room . If there was once indeterminism or chance, why not always? What is special
about t=O?
The Christian view is that there is no exhaustive intra-creation determinism. Thus, anticipating Part" of
this essay, Christian theism, in fact, implies some form of "quantum mechanical"-like epistemology. Man
in his finiteness can not exhaustively plumb the depths of God's creation. There always will be mystery
to man; it is inherent in his creatureliness. At the ultimate level, creation is governed and sustained by
Christ according to His will, so that all equations of motion are of the form

dX _ F(X,t," will of God" ) .
dt

(5)

No matter how "non-mathematical" such an expression appears, I have intentionally refrained from a
notation which would reduce the "will of God" to a set of "hidden variables"! Clearly, God is not subject
to a back reaction according to Newton's third law! The atheistic worldview, of course, implicitly assumes
equations of the above form but with the phrase "will of God" replaced by "(irreducible) chance" or by
terms which are irreducible random events. At the "macroscopic" level, we have a view where ''will of God"
appears absent; however, this is really not the case since at the meta-level even the equation itself is a
statement of God's will".
In summary, the purely subjectivist theory views all probability issues as Bayesian conditionalization
working from some putative absolute initial probability distribution on phase space. How the initial
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condition arose is left to Chance in the atheistic worldview or to the absent-landlord god of Deism; and
"randomness" is equivalent to deterministic chaotic dynamics.
Ontological probability, or "reified chance"

This view rejects the deterministic physical causalism of the epistemological view and by an appeal to
"Occam's razor" substitutes a "simpler" hypothesis, indeterminism, which rather than being an initial onetime fluke, is uniformly present, everywhere and forever. In this atheistic view, "chance" is the impersonal
purposeless "cause" or determiner of unaccountable happenings. Of course, this is an empty idea. It is
not a rational explanation, for it posits a determiner of the undetermined.
Proponents of this view are Popper (28), [29],(30), (31) (as expounded in his "neo-classical" or "propensity
theory") , David Bohm (7), and Reichenbach (33) . As Brody [9, p.108) points out, attempts to objectify
"chance" as a quantitative property of the physical universe meet with difficulties from the first. As he
cogently states, we can measure temperatures with thermometers and electric potential with voltmeters,
but where can one find a "pitanometer" or probability meter? Probabilities are always empirically
measured statistically by performing many measurements on many individuals of supposedly identically
selected states (identical for the purposes of the experiment) and taking averages. This corresponds to
the frequentist view, but it gets one no closer to a putative "objective" Chance.
To further demonstrate the emptiness of the belief in ontological chance, we should examine in more
detail some remarks of Bohm (7) in this regard. Bohm relies upon the typical dualism of anti-theistic
thought in which nature is governed by two distinct, independent, and equally ultimate principles - causal
laws and the laws of chance. This is just another way of stating the anti-theistic duality principles of
"rationality and irrationality," "closed universe and open universe," and "continuity and discontinuity." As
Bohm [7, p.28) puts it: ". .. the causal laws and the laws of chance together are what bring about the
actual development of things .. .. " (emph. his). Yet, for Bohm, "chance phenomena" - though supposedly
objectified and observable in the "laws of chance" - are always "randomly fluctuating and independent
contingencies lying outside the context under discussion," (emph. added) [7, p.28) . Bohm believes
chance is ultimate, for, as he admits later [7, p.29) : "Thus we never really can eliminate contingencies.
Rather, the categories of necessary causal connection and chance contingencies are seen to represent
two sides of all processes." (em ph. added) . Therefore, for Bohm, a neo-Heraclitean, chance is a synonym
of ultimate mystery and ultimate irrationality. Chance always lies forever beyond the horizon of an everexpanding sequence of contexts. This "Chance of the gaps" is part of the atheist's creed.
With these few brief remarks, I proceed to the Christian foundations of probability theory. More will be
said about ontological probability below in the section titled "Critique of probability arguments."
The Christian Theistic Foundations of Probability Theory

Theistically the truth is a combination of the epistemological and objective views. Probability is attributable
to a correlation between the limited knowledge of man and the external objective state of affairs - again
arranged according to the eternal decree of God. The concept of probability thus reduces to an issue
of the creaturely and necessarily finite nature of man. To state it another way, probability characterizes
the relation of the derivative and finite mind of man to the finite world of facts or states of affairs. Yet, in
regard to the description or enumeration of these states of affairs (or better, possibilia) only insofar as
these possibilia can be categorized can the concept of probability be applied. There will be cases where
deterministic explanation fails and also when probabilistic explanation fails - both of these understood
theistically - and that leaves only the will of God as the ultimate explanation. Since God is personal,
the outcomes are ultimately His free choice. This view is required by the Biblical data, which as we have
seen, asserts that all possibilia must be rooted in and come solely from God Himself; and the personal
free choices of God are not subject to a higher deterministic law or to a more ultimate indeterministic
principle.
This discussion shows that the Christian view of the objective component of probability should be
construed as inter-subjective . Thus, I am suggesting that the Christian view is a combination of the
subjective and objective philosophies of probability. In this regard it perfectly fits the fundamental
Christian dualism of the Creator/creature distinction. By this is meant that for certain probability
distributions there will be objective criteria for assigning probabilities, yet the probability is subjective in
the sense that it results from creaturely ignorance of the mind of God. There are objective standards for
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assigning "possibilia" because these are based upon the kindness and providence of God, who sustains
the creation moment by moment in a regular fashion .
To elaborate on the relation of probability to a correlation between man's knowledge and the external
possibilia, consider a sample space 0. which is the collection of (denumerable) possibilia, or events,
denoted as <O' ... <On .. .9 I qualify this statement by the remark that only in the case of very narrowly
circumscribed systems can we even specify 0.. Now consider the class U of unary relations (or single
argument predicates) on n, viz. U = '2? For a given u; E U we can construct the frequency or
probability p; as

O(U;)

p; - 0(0) ,

(6)

where o(X) denotes the "order" or number of elements in set X. This definition is consistent with the
Kolmogorovaxioms. Thus, as this example presumed, if we speak of an <0 "drawn at random" (i.e. without
human foresight) from n, ceteris paribus, then p; is the probability that <0 E U;.

CRITIQUE OF "PROBABILITY ARGUMENTS'
In this final section I would like to digress to submit what I believe to be a constructive criticism of
Christian uses of probability arguments against evolutionary theory. The point may seem subtle, but it
is a pOint that we need to keep in mind when testifying to the truth of Christian theism : In any
presentation, we must be clear that our argument is designed to show the untenability of the purely
atheistic evolutionary theory as viewed from within their worldview. In light of the presuppositional
apologetic and Scripture's testimony regarding probability, we need to be clear that the argument is not
an argument that we, as Christians, are presenting from within our worldview.
One type of probability argument considers the likelihood that the fundamental constants of physics have
value to support life. The argument then proceeds along the following general lines. Denote by n the
set, {all possible states of affairs of the fUndamental constants}. Let ~(L) denote the measure of set L,
where LeO. is the set L = {all possible states of affairs of the fundamental constants that can sustain
life} . 0Ne ignore discussion of the impossible task of how science can assign a measure to such a
space.) Then the likelihood of life is given by the probability that the value of the fundamental constants
(denoted by a) is in the set L

p( aEL) - I1(L)
11(0) ,

(7)

which even though perhaps improbable is not impossible . Thus, assuming the anti-theist is willing to
believe (1) in "self-existent immaterial laws inherent in matter," (2) minimal entropy initial conditions, and
(3) finite time - then the material reductionist faces the apparent dilemma of a low likelihood of life
occurring within the supposed age of the universe. It is apparent that some atheists feel the pressure of
this argument on the internal inconsistency of their worldview in that they continually appeal to "laws of
self organization" which supposedly accelerate the appearance of life and which mitigate the local effects
of the second law of thermodynamics.
However, to the atheist there is no "law" which ultimately determines the trajectory of a(t) within 0., except
perhaps a non-deterministic Markov process. Thus, this worldview reduces to the atheistic 'trinity" of
Chronos, Tyche and Anagke. (Note: In this worldview space-time itself, as modeled by a space-time
metric g;j(t), is viewed as a derived or synthetic feature of reality, cf. "The Black Box: The Reprocessing
of the Universe," in Misner, Thorne and Wheeler [24, p.1209].) In summary, the womb of Tyche produces
all things and everything by the insemination of father Chronos. Note the intentionally pagan cast used
here in order to expose the ludicrousness of the view. In spite of this irrational approach, modern science
still attempts, in general, to project a rationalist view of science to the general public.
Another current strain of irrationalism in science is that all is ultimately irrational, that there are no
permanent or eternal "laws" of the physical universe (as Christians we would agree that there are no
eternal laws of the physical universe unless God chooses to so maintain them) . In this worldview the All
is governed by ultimate Chaos, and the laws which we now observe are ultimately just a '1Iuke." Given
enough time, the All will transmute itself into every configuration. As a result, there are no probability
rebuttals to this view, except that it offers no intelligible explanation for consciousness, ethics, laws of
logic, or rationality. For example, the atheist has no rational explanation of how rationality can arise from
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an initially irrational universe. Literally this view is that the All is ultimately irrational and, truly, nothing but
"sound and fury signifying nothing." As Bahnsen has pOinted out, this view will even allow the historicity
of Christ and His resurrection. The atheist will retort, "Well, it's a strange universe and strange things
happen." He can even allow that the scriptures exist as testimonies to these events but disallow that God
is behind these phenomena. After all, the All is the mother of all phenomena, including a "cycle of the
All" in which such events as the person of Christ occur along with "mistaken interpretations" of those
events. Our response is to reprove such an extreme view by asking the atheist why he even "goes
through the motions," since in his view there is no 'truth" and thus he has no intelligible basis for making
the claim that the Scriptures are a "mistaken interpretation." In an attempt to escape from this dilemma,
unbelieving thought always appeals to a "meta" level of eternal rationality which is actually external to the
supposed Ali. It is at this point that the unbelieving scientist is really attacking Christianity by stealing, as
Van Til said [41 , p.84], the very capital of Christianity. In order to "rationally" attack Christianity using the
"successes" of science, the unbelieving scientist must assume the Christian view of truth!
The point of these observations for the defense of the faith is that we must not only declare the
resurrection as a historical fact (for it is not just a brute fact, as the above brand of atheists will allow), but
we must also declare the resurrection to be what Christ's self-attesting testimony declares it to be - His
victory over death and His finished work which redeemed the elect and further gave proof of future
judgment awaiting those outside Christ's work on the cross.
Finally, as an example of how different worldviews interpret so-called brute facts, consider the
"implications" of time-varying fundamental physical "constants," such as G, c, h, etc. An observation of
time-varying "constants, " as interpreted in a Christian theistic worldview, would be confirmatory of God's
control over whatsoever comes to pass. God is the governor and sustainer of the variations. Yet, from
the atheistic or anti-theistic worldview, indications of varying constants would be seen as a confirmation
that the current state of affairs sprang from ultimate chaos. In rebuttal to the evidentialist approach that
the constants are 'tuned" to support life and thus "prove" the existence of God, the atheist would retort
that we "just happened to be around" when the constants randomly drifted into the "conscious life"supporting region of the globat parameter space of constants. In other words, given enough time, chance
will spawn anything and everything, and, of course, it is then trivially true that conscious life will always
"observe" constants compatible with life. This view will raise its head in the "many worlds" interpretation
of quantum mechanics in Part II.
CONCLUSION
The Biblical testimony is that there is no such thing as inherently "random" processes. All of creation is
ruled according to God's plan. There will always be processes and events for which there are no humanly
knowable or aSSignable causes since they are the result of God's all-inclusive providence. Thus we
conclude: (1) Probability statements are always an expression of creaturely ignorance, and in this sense,
"probability" is epistemological; (2) God, who is the source of all possibilia, is the absolute objective
standard of predication, and He sets the bounds for all events; therefore, there is also an objective basis
for creaturely estimates of probabilities; and (3) Since there is no such thing as objective chance, the
concepts of probability in classical mechanics and in quantum mechanics are identical and refer to limited
human knowledge. The further consequence of this theistic approach to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics will be continued in Part Ii.

PART II: THE CHRISTIAN THEISTIC VIEW OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
INTRODUCTION
"The moon is definitely not there when nobody looks .. ,," David Mermin
''The only law is the law that there is no law." J.A. Wheeler
Such views as Mermin's anti-realist interpretation of quantum mechanics or Wheeler's praise of ultimate
irrationality are typical of the vast onslaught against the revealed truth of Christian theism. Such claims
as these are widespread, not just in professional journals, but also in popular books on quantum
mechanics which fill the shelves of science sections in local bookstores. Other popularizations tout the
"affinity" of quantum mechanics and modern physics with eastern religions, and thus are a direct attack
on the revealed truth of Christianity. Typical of these is the opinion expressed by Menas Kafatos [19, p.3]
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in his book,''The Conscious Universe" - a revealing title which leaves no doubt as to where the book will
lead - wherein he states: "Where metaphysics is the primary emphasis in books . . . the usual conclusion
seems to be that the worldview of modern physics is more consistent with Taoism, Hinduism, and
Buddhism ."
The purpose of the second part of this essay is intended not only to refute such claims as these, but also
to show that the revealed doctrines concerning the nature of God, man, knowledge, and the creation, in
general, provide the presuppositional basis for the correct interpretation of certain aspects of quantum
mechanics.
Since quantum mechanics (though as I will show later it is really the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics) has been used as what might be termed "evidentialism for false religions," the reader
can understand the general aversion of Christians toward quantum mechanics. Such aversion would be
correct if these anti-theistic interpretations were a necessary consequence of quantum mechanics;
however, I will argue that those interpretations (based upon the Copenhagen interpretation and its
derivatives) that favor eastern mysticism are not required. I will give a quick outline of the most publicized
interpretations and also describe the less well-known interpretations such as the deBroglie-Bohm "pilot
wave" theory, and the ensemble interpretation, as these have features which comport with Christian
theism. I will also briefly discuss the issues that have contributed to what Popper aptly called the "Great
Quantum Muddle." These issues are the "acausal" collapse problem, the infamous "quantum jumps," and
the invalid reasoning behind interpretations of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. My goal is to remove
objections to quantum mechanics based on the faulty interpretations which have been promulgated.
Finally, and perhaps most important, I will also point out some of the logical flaws in the analysis of the
Aspect experiment and its violation of the Bell inequality (this experiment has been used to promote
everything from pantheism and mysticism to paranormal phenomena and parapsychology). It will be
shown that the Aspect experiment does not lend support to the Copenhagen interpretation (henceforth
occasionally abbreviated as CI). These latter comments will be based upon the work of Brody [9]. I will
conclude with a critique of some papers by Lucas and Bergman in which they argue against quantum
mechanics and in favor of classical physics.
INTERPRETATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS

There are, in general, four well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics which have been proposed
to "explain" the quantum phenomena via an underlying "metaphysics." These views are: (1) the
Copenhagen interpretation and its variants; (2) the deBroglie-Bohm pilot wave interpretation; (3) the many
worlds interpretation; and (4) quantum logic. A less well-known view is the ensemble interpretation.
I will begin with brief descriptions of these views, and then proceed to the positive task of developing the
Christian realist interpretation of QM. In order to set the framework for the subsequent discussion, I will
first review the "one mystery' of quantum mechanics, namely the well-known double-slit experiment.
DOUBLE-SLIT EXPERIMENT

The double-slit experiment first performed by Young
in 1801 provided firm experimental evidence of the
wave properties of light. Before Young's experiment,
Newton had postulated that light consisted of
particles (corpuscles); however, corpuscular light
moving according to the laws of Newton's mechanics
would instead produce a superposition of two bellshaped curves, I, and 12 , as shown to the right of S
in Figure 1. The wave nature of light remained
unchallenged for nearly a century until the
quantitative measurements by Millikan in the early
Millikan's
1900s on the photoelectric effect.
experiments added impetus to the developing
quantum theory and its concept of the dual nature of
light eventually became canonized in the principle of
wave-particle duality. It is this duality which gives
rise to some of the most baffling concepts central to
the theory and which are used as the prime supports
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I,(y)+I,(y)
Figure 1 Double Slit Experiment

of the CI of quantum mechanics. To elucidate the source of these mysteries, we now turn to a detailed
discussion of the double-slit experiment with electrons.
When the experiment is performed with particles, such as electrons, the mystery begins. Electrons are
incident from the left on a screen in which are two slits labeled A and B, and finally strike a screen or
photographic plate S, where they are detected. The impacts of the electrons result in a series of
alternating bright and dark strips, or interference fringes. The observed interference fringes could be
easily explained by the phenomena of wave motion and the related effects of constructive and destructive
addition of wave motion as detailed in introductory physics texts. At first one might think that the
interference is due to a "crowding wave" effect as a result of the presence of vast numbers of electrons,
which as a collective effect act somewhat similarly to gas molecules which collectively produce pressure
waves or "sound." However, this is not the case.
If the experiment is run at low intensity such that only one electron at a time is incident on the slits, what
is observed is a sequence of scintillations which slowly build up until, after a long running time, an
interference pattern emerges (1'2 in Figure 1). When the experiment is run with only one slit open, no
interference pattern appears. But how can the particle be influenced by the other slit through which it did
not pass, assuming the electron has a well-defined trajectory and can only travel through one slit at a
time? When only one slit is open, we obtain a bell curve (I, or 12 to the right of "S" in Figure 1). But when
both slits are open, allowing two possible paths for the electron, what results is that certain pOints on the
screen (e.g. pOint X in Figure 1), which detected electrons when one slit was open, now detect none!
This redistribution of impacts is baffling since in a particle view, opening the other slit should not cause
a decrease in the number of electrons detected at point "X",o. This effect has all the prima facie
earmarks of either: (1) action-at-a-distance (non-locality) , or (2) that there is no distinct trajectory for the
electron and yet it does, in some sense, pass through both slits at once like a wave. (I will later discuss
and refute the contention that the electron has no distinct trajectory.)
THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION(S)

It was the attempt to interpret such empirical data as the interference of single electrons that gave rise to
the Copenhagen interpretation and its notorious "acausal" collapse of the wave function . It should be
noted here that the phrase "acausal" really means "indeterminate" and not "acausal" in the sense of surd
events (though in the atheist interpretation even though the collapse is caused, the final outcome is
ultimately undetermined and, hence, ultimately irrational).
The Copenhagen interpretation and its variants can be considered as an outgrowth of either a confusion
between ontology and epistemology, or as an indecision between the two. This confusion is manifest in
the canonized principle of ''wave-particle duality." Though the CI is the "orthodoxy" presented in most
modern quantum textbooks, the list of dissenters includes such notable phYSicists as Einstein, deBroglie,
SchrOdinger, Lande, and Bohm. In the CI the'll function represents a probability wave for a single particle
(the potentia of Heisenberg), and actually describes a "matter of facr' pertaining to a single particle. As
long as no measurement is made (for example by removing the screen S in Figure 1), the wave function
propagates away from the slits and represents possible locations of the electron. Only when the screen
is inserted (a measurement) does the electron reveal its location. Since the electron wave is viewed as
"real ," this means that at the moment the plate was inserted the electron had to be prepared to "collect
itself' from all points in space and "collapse" to a single point on the screen. Where it will appear is
unpredictable, but it will appear somewhere and then be describable by a'll function whose distribution
is sharply defined.
We note at this point that this "collapse" has all the features of probabilistic
conditionalization as stated in Bayes' theorem. This has been pointed out by Popper [29, pp.78-9,124-5)
and has been further investigated by Brody [9) in the ensemble interpretation to be discussed later.
At this point, let me summarize the axioms of the Copenhagen interpretation, which are added to the
mathematical framework of quantum mechanics. It is these which will require modification or rejection to
bring the interpretation of quantum mechanics into a Christian theistic worldview. These assumptions,
which will be referred to as (CI-1), (CI-2) and (CI-3), are:
(CI-1) ontological probability assumption;
(CI-2) "acausal" collapse assumption; and
(CI-3) non-disturbance (or repeatability) of measurements.
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According to CI-1, the wave function '1', qua probability, has ontological significance; it describes an actual
"matter of fact" or "state of affairs" of (a subsystem of) the universe. Since the wave function is a solution
of a linear equation, it can thus represent a superposition of many physically contrary states of affairs.
Second, according to CI-2, the wave function 'I' develops "causally" or deterministically, according to the
linear Schrodinger equation, until a measurement is performed when the '£I-function undergoes a nonunitary "acausal" or "undetermined" collapse to an eigenstate of the measured quantity. This collapse is
not governed by the SchrOdinger equation. An act of measurement results in a suspension of the normal
evolution of the probabilities as determined by the SchrOdinger equation. The actual state which will result
from a measurement is undetermined except that the results of many such experiments will exhibit
statistical frequencies consistent with a "singular" probability of transition for each state n, according to
the Born rule
(8)

where Ia,,) is an eigenstate of the quantity A measured by the experiment. Finally, CI-3 states that if a
system is in a pure eigenstate of an observable, then subsequent measurements of that observable yield
(with probability = 1) the same value.
It is clear that CI-1 , the ontological probability assumption, is the radical anti-theistic claim, and that all of
the difficulties of the CI center on the insistence that the wave function pertains to a single particle
quantum system. The consequences ofthis assumption are the measurement problem and the notorious
"acausal" collapse, CI-2, of the wave function. To illustrate the difficulties, let us explore, once more, the
two-slit interference experiment. If, as CI-1 states, the electron wave function really is a potentiality wave
spreading from both slits in all directions, and the measurement of the wave at the plate S in Figure 1 is
a discrete localized scintillation, then the consequence is that the wave function has to collapse in a blink
from a wave dispersed over the whole spatial extent of the interference fringe (essentially y= ± 00) by
gathering itself instantaneously from "hither and yon" to condense at the observed location. This is clearly
a non-local phenomenon and also non-deterministic in the sense that there is no law which can predict
where the particle appears and how the wave function evolves. These observations lead to the
measurement problem in the CI, and all of the failed attempts to construct a theory of physical
measurements within the CI. The battle among the anti-theists is between the Cartesian dualists ("mind
and matter" is all that exists), on the one hand, and the material monists and the idealist monists, on the
other. In particular it is here that one sees the anti-realists and phenomenologists (who subordinate
everything including measurements to the consciousness of the observer) making statements that
ultimately lead to the ridiculous conclusion that the "state of the universe" (which to a potential observer
is nothing but a bundle of "sense perceptions") depends on the mental health of the observer.
As stated earlier, CI-1 and CI-2 exhibit the confusion between ontology and epistemology. CI-1 blends
an ontology with probability (which, as we have seen, is theistically always epistemological); while CI-2,
as a consequence of CI-1, must blend ontology with epistemology, by making Bayesian conditionalization
a purely physical phenomenon. This suggests that (1) if we exorcise the ontological probability
assumption, that is, if the wave function is not a potentia but a physical field, and (2) the measurement
problem as expressed by (CI-2) is not just physical but also epistemological, then OM can be given a
consistent Christian theistic interpretation.
The Heisenberg uncertainty relation

I now come to the interpretation of the well-known Heisenberg uncertainty relation. This relation has a
long history of debated interpretations, which, as Popper has pointed out, have contributed to what he
appropriately called the "great quantum muddle." [29, p.5] .
The subjectivist and idealist trends in quantum mechanics have led to the anti-realist tendency to refer
to the uncertainty relation as the "indeterminacy relation." The intent of this change in terminology is to
emphasize the anti-realist denial that quantum particles have simultaneous positions and momenta - that
is, the quantum particle cannot even be said to have a "classical trajectory." Or, in a less anti-realist
(though still irrational) vein, we have the sentiment of Hans Reichenbach [33] that the indeterminacy is
rooted in "causal anomalies." The subsequent analysis presented here, based in part on Brody and
Popper, will describe the extent of the "muddle" and the solution.
The uncertainty relation states that, in principle, it is impossible to simultaneously determine the postmeasurement position and momentum of a particle. This destroys mechanistic determinism, for no initial
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data can be found to predict the future (since we cannot collect the initial data for a Cauchy surface). We
note that this is different from the limits imposed by chaotic dynamics which places a practical limit on
predicting the future of mechanical systems, i.e. we can predict the future development of a sufficiently
small system provided we are willing to pay the cost of obtaining the required precision. QM, on the other
hand, says that there is a limit beyond which no expenditure of additional effort can produce any increase
in knowledge.
Disturbance interpretation
Heisenberg explicitly bases his interpretation of the uncertainty relation upon the disturbance of the
physical system by the act of measurement. In his remarks on "Illustrations of the Uncertainty Relations"
[18, p.20], he states:
This may be expressed in the concise and general terms by saying that every experiment
destroys some of the knowledge of the system which was obtained by previous
experiments. This formulation makes it clear that the uncertainty relation does not refer to
the past; if the velocity of the electron is at first known and the position measured, the
position for time previous to the measurement may be calculated. Then for these past times
t¥;/;!q is smaller than the usual limiting value . ... " (emph. added) .
However, we also note Heisenberg's concession to anti-realism when he immediately remarks [18, p.20],
"It is a matter of personal belief whether such a calculation concerning the past history of the electron can
be assigned any physical reality or not." It seems ironic that Heisenberg would make such a statement
when his whole argument has just hinged on the basis of the disturbance interpretation. The question
in this author's mind is: How can one physically disturb something that is not real? How could any
science be done when all measurement must necessarily be based upon past histories, and yet these
past histories are "not real?" This lapse again shows how even high-caliber physicists like Heisenberg can
succumb to the quantum "muddle"!
Central to the interpretation of the uncertainty relation is the meaning of the variance or "deltas" in the
formula
(9)

Any empirical test of this relation would require that frequencies of precise simultaneous position and
momentum values be computed. Thus, it is clear that this is an ensemble verification and not a singular
case. Every verification of the Heisenberg relation requires statistics over an ensemble in which both P
and Q have been measured, so where does it require the relation to hold for the singular object? When
we review the proofs of this relation we note that it applies to any quantum state, and that means
"unreduced." Yet the empirical proof of this relation requires reduction of the wave function by a
measurement. The conclusion is inescapable - as pointed out by Popper and Brody [9, p.162) - this
relation pertains to an ensemble of particles, not to a Single particle. The variances that appear cannot
apply per se to a limitation on simultaneous measurement of position and momentum. If the formula
means that the momentum and position cannot be simultaneously measured to sufficient precision, then
the relation would not be experimentally testable.

1'1',>

We should note that even measurements of
momentum rely upon measurements of position
and retrodiction of momentum which requires an
assumption of continuous trajectories. In the
single-slit diffraction experiment, illustrated in
Figure 2, the momentum is related to the
deflection distance t:..y via
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Of course, this measurement of momentum is a

retrodiction, yet nonetheless, it ascribes a
simultaneous position and momentum to the
particle that strikes the screen at point P in

Figure 2 Quantum Diffraction Experiment
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Figure 2, for at least some time interval shortly prior to the impact. These measurements satisfy the
relation
(11)

which is contrary to the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. Of course, to determine the momentum of the
electron after the impact would require a second screen, and that screen would also exhibit a scatter
relation in agreement with the Heisenberg uncertainty relation as interpreted by the ensemble
interpretation (to be described below). As Popper [29, p.63] states, "But once we ascribe physical reality
to measurements for which, as Heisenberg admits, apaq«h, the whole situation changes completely: for
now there can be no question whether according to the quantum theory, an electron can 'have' a precise
position and momentum. It can."
What about those "quantum jumps·?

"If we have to go on with these damned quantum jumps, then I'm sorry that I ever got
involved." E. Schrooinger
The collapse of the wave function under a measurement is sometimes called the non-existence of
"classical" trajectories. The statement is often made that QM implies that particles have no trajectories in
the classical sense of the term. Further, this statement is made in the context of the Copenhagen
interpretation with its acausal collapse assumption and the false interpretations of the Heisenberg
Uncertainty relation. At this point, I will show that postulate CI-3 of "non-disturbance" of states (or
"repeatability of measurements) as applied to a dynamical variable is logically inconsistent with the acausal
collapse assumption. In other words, non-disturbance of measured states implies that there are no
"quantum jumps" or "acausal collapses" in the real (i.e. mechanical) sense asserted by CI in the
assumption (CI-2) above. Quantum mechanics does deny mechanistic determinism, and thus there is no
exhaustive equation of motion which we can integrate forward in time to obtain a future mechanical state
- yet, this does not imply that the trajectories are discontinuous - rather, QM implies a sort of Brownianlike motion of particles, i.e. the trajectories are continuous, but the first derivatives are not continuous " .
It may be further remarked that this continuity is explicitly employed in the path integral formulations of
quantum mechanics, inasmuch as the "sum over histories" is always performed over a space of
continuous trajectories.

Repeatability of measurements (CI-3) means that if one measures the value of a conserved quantum
quantity, then a subsequent measurement will reveal the same value. Or, if one measures a dynamic
observable such as the position Q, then the following limiting condition must obtain:
lim (A A
A . )
(12)

cSt_oIIaU(t+cSt,t)IIa-II a Iw(t» )-O ,

where U is the unitary time evolution operator and

lla - IQ) (QI

(13)

is the non-unitary (idempotent) projection operator corresponding to the result of a position measurement
with value Q. Equation (12) states that if we measure the position of a particle at a given time and
compare it with the position measured a short time later, then the difference approaches zero as the time
interval approaches zero. This is equivalent to the standard "epsilon-delta" proof of continuity. The limit
is clearly zero since the unitary operator U is continuous in time. This proof can be repeated by applying
the same steps in the momentum representation , the conclusion then being that the momentum also
changes in a continuous (though unpredictable) manner as a result of measurement. This empirically
verified "recipe" is accepted by the CI without realizing the logical consequence: the "quantum object' has
continuous trajectories. We should also point out that the continuity of trajectories is also empirically
verified repeatedly by cloud chamber and spark chamber tracks. Based on these observations, we
conclude, as expected, that CI-1 must be rejected or modified.
These observations thus demonstrate that the commonly held view of "quantum jumps" as applied to
canonical position and momentum is incorrect. But what of "quantum jumps" between stationary states,
as characterized by energy? It was in this context that some of the original debates concerning jumps
were argued; in particular, the energy transitions of atoms in thermal equilibrium with external
electromagnetic fields. The question was raised whether the electrons "jumped" instantaneously from one
orbital to another as it either absorbed or emitted quanta of photons.
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Suppose that an electron is in a pure energy eigenstate prior to time t, :
-IE"t

11jr(t»-e

~

(14)

lEn )·

Suppose now that the atom is coupled to the electromagnetic field by a time-dependent interaction

fI-flo(p,l/J + Ii{p,q,t) ,

(15)

where the time-dependent potential, V, is non-zero only for t, ~ t ~ to. In this case the issue of which
stationary energy states apply during the interaction interval is not so clear cut. The usual prescription
for dealing with such issues, for example in quantum scattering theory, is to ignore the question of the
state during the interaction. What is asked instead is what are the probabilities of transitions between the
asymptotic non-interacting stationary states, at t=-oo and t= + 00. These stationary states can be clearly
defined; however, ignoring the issue of states during the transition is not to deny the esSential continuity
of the trajectories during the interaction. That this transition is continuous again follows from the fact that
the state evolves via the unitary Lie transformation (necessarily continuous in the group parameter t)

11jr(tIl »)- u(tll,t/)I1jr(t/»)-ex+~ (H(~dt}1jr(t/»).

(16)

DEBROGLIE-BOHM "PILOT WAVE" THEORY
This interpretation (for a detailed exposition, see [8)) avoids most ofthe conundrums of the Copenhagen
class of interpretations, and if it is divorced from Bohm's pagan conceptions - which are not intrinsic to
the interpretation - it seems to merit further investigation and a study of its features which can be given
a consistent Christian theistic construction. It posits both particle and wave. The wave is a "pilot" wave
that exists in addition to the particle. In the case of the double-slit experiment, the wave given by

'P(x,t) - R(x,t) exp( is(;,t))

(17)

passes through both slits but the particle only goes through one. The particle experiences a "quantum"
force due to the presence of the wave which acts as a "quantum potential" given by the equation
Q__

£

'if-R.

(18)

2m R
The net result is that the force acts to move the particle into regions of higher p = 1'1'12 and away from
regions of lower p. This interpretation can thus account for the interference fringes and the discrete
particle nature of the electron itself. In this theory the actual trajectory is deterministic and causal, the final
position being predetermined by the electron's initial conditions. The theory then requires that
p(O) - 1'P(t- O,XW
(19)
also represent the likelihood of the electron being prepared in the specified initial state. In this regard the
interpretation shares the features of the ensemble interpretation to be discussed later. The theory is
incomplete. We need not worry about this; whether there is a lower level accessible to man is irrelevant
to the debate between Christians and unbelievers.
As for the supposed objection that the "pilot wave" is of an unusual sort in that it does not carry energy
in the usual sense, we need only note that when we go to the relativistic version of quantum field theory
(OFT) , the field there plays the same theoretical role as the deBroglie wave. To clarify this, recall that in
OFT of a scalar field, the Hamiltonian of the field is given by

fI_l J[q,2+(v(d+ m2<p2]d 3x_L N(K)w(K).
2

(20)

K

Thus, the energy is solely "carried by" the particles; yet, the field represents the "amplitude" for "creation"
of particles in the various momentum states.
This concept of "particle and wave" removes the objections due to the paradoxical conclusions of "waveparticle" duality. Further, it can account for particle "interference" phenomena. These features are
compatible with Christian theism and provide a basis for a Christian theistic interpretation of aM, to be
presented below.
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EVERETT-WHEELER MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION

This interpretation need not detain us long. It is clearly anti-theistic and reductionistic. This view entertained as an alternative to the difficulties of the CI collapse assumption and measurement problem
- is the conclusion one would arrive at in order to maintain linearity of the wave equation and to exorcise
the interpretation of the irrationality of the wave function collapse, while maintaining the ontological status
of 'I' as a probability function. So, rather than abandoning the ontological assumption of the 'I' function,
this interpretation elevates 'I' to "all there is." According to this view, 'I' never collapses but evolves
linearly according to the universal Hamiltonian which includes all measurement interactions. As 'I'
evolves, all possible worlds which could result from measurements actually do occur. The universe
bifurcates continuously and infinitely into "alternate" history universes which have no causal connection
with each other.
In brief, any solution of the SchrOdinger equation a/ways describes the state of affairs. Reality actually is
the ensemble or totality of "all possible worlds." In this worldview, all things which can happen (provided
they are consistent with the Hamiltonian and the initial wave function 'I'(t=O)) in fact do happen.
It is clear that this is an irrational view for rational beings to hold. For in this view, there are worlds in
which "beings" irrationally ascribe to the many worlds view - not because it is "logical" - but rather,
because the bifurcation of all quantum states has placed the "believers" of the many worlds view in a
quantum state that corresponds to this "belief." In this particular "possible" world, they must, by necessity,
believe the many worlds view. This is so because it is one of all possible worlds. In another "parallel
universe" there are "beings" who do not believe this to be the case. This is another worldview where
rationality is just an illusion. With these few remarks we will proceed to the next aberrant view.
QUANTUM LOGIC INTERPRETATION

One attempt to circumvent the problems of the Copenhagen interpretation is the "quantum logic"
interpretation. Fortunately, this view has not attracted many adherents, and our discussion of this
interpretation, as with the many-worlds view, need not detain us long.
Some of its proponents will make the outlandish claim that the 'true" logic of reality is non-Boolean, and
that we should beat a hasty retreat from "dated, man-made" Aristotelian (or "classical") logic. We can
dispense with quantum logic by observing first that quantum "logic" and other such deviant logics are not
logics at all. This fact has been commented on by Quine and Haack. The first point to make is that the
deviant logics confuse the issue of predication with the laws of logic, per se. Issues of what can be
predicated of reality belong to the realm of godly philosophy. As Quine puts it [32, p.85], they confuse
knowledge of the single fact of knowing "something to be true or false" with the entirely different issue of
two separate statements: (a) "knowing something to be true" or (b) "knowing something to be false." As
to the claim that deviant logics (of which quantum logic is an example) are the "real" laws of logic which
govern all processes in the Universe - including our "minds" - and which should replace "classical
logic," we merely need to point out that, at the meta-level, (i.e. when discoursing about many-valued
logics), we use classical 2-valued logic. This point has been cogently argued by many philosophers of
logic. Haack, for instance states "(most) many-valued logics are contained in 2-valued logic (i.e. all of their
theorems are theorems in 2-valued logic, and not vice versa)." [17, p.2]. Brody [9, p.251] makes a similar
point when he states (emph. added):
If quantum logic is the only acceptable logic for quantum mechanics (indeed, if any but
Boolean logic is required), the fact that the entire development of quantum theory could
occur without it needs explaining; but to the author's knowledge no such explanation is yet
forthcoming. Moreover, the Boolean-based derivation of quantum results should sometimes
be wrong, yet no such misleading derivations appear to be known.
Once this is admitted, it follows that the so-called deviant "logics" are not really addressing logic (i.e.
modes of valid inference), but rather, they are merely discussing what can be predicated. As I pointed
out previously, from a theistic point of view, all predication, i.e. statements about reality, has its source
in God.
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ENSEMBLE INTERPRETATION
This interpretation, presented by Brody [9, pp.159-184), has a lot to say for it. Since it avoids the extreme
forms of anti-theistic metaphysics, I believe that it should be investigated and elaborated on within the
Christian theistic worldview. The main feature of the CI which the ensemble interpretation is intent on
exorcising is the belief that the wave function describes a single quantum system. According to the
ensemble interpretation, the wave function is like the probability density in classical probability theory.
It does not describe individuals, but rather a population of "identically" prepared systems. Consequently,
the ensemble view grants the incompleteness of the quantum mechanical description. As Brody [9,
p.178) states: ''To sum up, we have seen that, from the point of view of the ensemble interpretation,
quantum mechanics is incomplete, that any completion should be stochastic in nature, and that the
resulting theory will likely be of a very different character."
From the pOint of view of the ensemble interpretation, we can immediately dismiss the paradox of that
other "macabre measurement problem," viz. SchrOdinger's cat. Recall that the Copenhagen school
ascribes a "smoky" reality to the state
",(~ _ e -tIT I" live cat"l+(1-e -tIT ) I" dead cat") .
(21)
However, in the ensemble view, o/(t) represents the ensemble of "identically prepared" experiments. In
half of the experiments the atom has decayed, killing different cats, and in the other half the cats are still
living .
These remarks should be sufficient to at least show - even if they do not decisively prove - that the
ensemble interpretation has enough explanatory power to warrant further investigation and elaboration
by Christian scientists. From this summary, note that, as pointed out previously, incompleteness of all
humanly stated truths is a necessary consequence of the Biblical revelation concerning man and God man is finite and his knowledge is true but non-exhaustive (i.e. incomplete) . Second, as Christians we
would note that any theory which appears stochastic from the human perspective has really touched the
limits of human knowledge, and apparently random data is not random in the anti-theistic sense, but really
a testimony to the providence of God. Thus, the stochastic aspect of the ensemble interpretation can be
given a Christian theistic interpretation, for, as I have pointed out, God is still behind all apparently
"random" events, as Provo 16:33 explicitly states.
THE EPR PARADOX, BELL'S INEQUALITIES AND ASPECT EXPERIMENT
I now examine several quantum mechanical systems which have been widely publicized via
popularizations in the press and on television. Such systems have been used to promulgate anti-theistic
worldviews to the man in the street. Inasmuch as these systems and the descriptions employed have a
prima facie plausibility, they would seem to require that a Christian theistic worldview reject quantum
mechanics. However, it has been known for some time - though not widely publicized - that the
popularized interpretations which have been used to promote mysticism and parapsychology (such as
mental telepathy), based on supposed "spooky action at a distance," are erroneous and that, in fact, there
are classical systems which violate Bell's inequality. This last observation thus shows the irrelevance of
the Bell inequality to the debate over the metaphysical foundations of quantum mechanics. Since these
discoveries have not been widely disseminated, I will spend some time giving a brief explanation of the
issues involved; the reader is referred to the original literature for more details, [9),[25),[36) .
Figure 3 is a schematic of the model
system investigated by Bell and which
forms the theoretical basis that
motivated the Aspect experiment. It
consists of an atom (at S) in an
Figure 3 Bohm's Version of EPR Experiment
excited spin-zero state which decays
by the emission of two spin-correlated electrons. The two electrons are emitted in opposite directions
toward two filters FA and Fe which consist of Stern-Gerlach magnets with orientation angles 9A and ge
relative to an arbitrary reference direction. Quantum mechanics predicts a correlation between the
electron spin components when measured along different spin directions at detectors DA and De. The
detectors count particle incidence at the positions indicated by +1 for particles deflected "up" and -1 for
particles deflected "down." Denote by (a,b) the paired values of particle counts at (A,B). The theoretical
QM value of the correlation, C, of particle counts at detector A and at detector B is given by
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(22)

The Bell inequality (in the form given by Clauser, Holt, Horne and Shimony (11) , and derived from
assumptions to be stated later) expresses limits on the range of the correlations when the experiment is
performed at different values of the angles 9A and BB' indicated by the presence of the primes, thus

V-I CAS - CAS' I + ICA ,s+ CA ,s" ~ 2 .

(23)

The choice of angles: 9A = 0°, 9. = 45°, 9N = 90° and 9•. = 135°, along with the theoretical OM
prediction of eq . (22), leads to the value V=2V2, which violates eq. (23) .
Assumptions of the Bell inequality theorems

The explicitly mentioned issues and assumptions that typically enter into the derivations of Bell inequalities
are the following (cf. Jarrett in (13)): (1) conservation (correlation); (2) locality (or ''factorizability''); and (3)
completeness. Sometimes these last two are called "separability" and "hidden variables." The argument
goes as follows : Since theory and experiment violate the Bell inequalities, one or more of the assumptions
must be false. The conclusion is then drawn that reality is either not local, or quantum mechanics is not
comp lete. (Note that rejection of completeness is a perfectly acceptable theistic conclusion. Conservation
is not a candidate for rejection since it is part of the "description" of the type of experiments under
consideration.) However, Brody and others have noted that there is one "hidden" assumption not listed
above. This is the assumption that the quantities being measured (assumed to be "random") possess a
joint probability distribution, or what is equivalent, that the quantities under consideration are capable of
being jointly measured - this, following Brody, will be referred to as the joint measurability assumption,
or JMA, for short.
Brody [9, p.232) , in particular, outlines four derivations of the Bell inequality: (1) Bell's original proof, (2)
Wigner and Holt, (3) Eberhard (1977) and Stapp (1971), and, finally, (4) Suppes and Zanotti [37]. I will
briefly outline and discuss these four derivations, following the discussion given by Brody [9, p.231). In
place of Bell's original proof, I will give my own "rotational symmetry" derivation of Bell's inequality,
assuming the spin itself is the "random" input variable for the random outcomes at detectors A and B.
In this form the proof is more general; a deterministic model can be obtained by setting the outcome
probabilities to 1. I will also give a longer discussion of the Suppes-Zanotti probability theoretic derivation
since it more clearly demonstrates the minimal core of assumptions necessary for the Bell inequality to
be satisfied, and is, thus, worth repeating in detail. The reader is referred to Brody (9) and the references
therein for a fuller discussion of the original derivations by Bell, Wigner-Holt, and Eberhard-Stapp.
Under the assumption of completeness, the joint probability of the result "a" at A and "b" at B is obtained
by using the conditional probabilities averaged over the density of the random hidden variable 1... Thus,

f

p(a,bI6 A,6sl - p(a,b I6A,6/1>A)p(A)dA .

(24)

Here, I.. represents the hidden common cause of the correlations, and is the variable which "completes"
(and exhausts) the physical description.
The assumptions of locality and separability allow the integrand to be expressed by the relation
p(a,bI6A ,6/1>A) - P(a I6A,A)P(b I6/1>A).

(25)

It expresses the condition that the result at each measuring device is dependent only upon its local setting
and the common cause denoted by the "hidden random" variable 1... In other words, the measured value
"a" at A is independent of the setting of the filter at B, and vice versa. Thus, the correlation function is
computed via the expression

Csb(6 A ,6sl -(ab)-

L f abp(a I6A,A)p(bI6/1>A)p(A)dA.

(26)

a.b

Finally, correlation is expressed by the relation

p(a,bI6A,6Al - {

ifab--1
d otherwise,

(27)

which states that when the magnets are positioned at the same angle, the results are always perfectly anticorrelated.
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In the next section these formulae are applied to a proof of the incompatibility of these assumptions with
the experimental results which agree with eq. (22).

A rotational symmetry proof
Again, we assume that the system decays into two spin-correlated pairs, and that the spins are the
completely specifiable "hidden variable." The probability can then be written as

,

p(als'S) - L f,(a)P,(s·S) .

(28)

This is the probability that the particle will be deflected in the a = ± 1 direction when the particle's spin
is in the direction of unit vector s and the magnet is aligned in direction of unit vector a. Here P, is the
IIh Legendre polynomial.
The correlation is then given by
(29)
where the separability and locality assumptions have been used to factor the probabilities.
"correlation" assumption, the spins incident at detectors A and B are related as
Sa- -SbBS.

By the
(30)

Equation (29) can then be simplified to

Cab- -~ abP(ala,S)P(blb,S»)s .

(31)

ab
Again, assuming that the spins are emitted isotropically so that the probability density of a given spin
direction on the unit sphere is uniform, we obtain the following:

Cab- - ~
4!t

J"Lab abp(ala,S)p(blb,S)d§

-- ~f[p(+1Ia,S)-p(-1 I a,S))[p(+1 I b,S) -P(- 1 I b,s)ldS
4!t

(32)

.

s

Integrating over and using the orthogonality properties of the Legendre polynomials straightforwardly
leads to the following:

C __~ [f,(+1)-f,(-1»)2 p(a.b).
ab 7
21+1
'

(33)

OM theoretically predicts and the experimental results (eq. (22» imply

0 if #1
f,(+1)-f,(-1) - {/3 if 1- 1

(34)

but the requirement that

p(+1 1·)+p(-1 1·) - 1

(35)

for all values of a magnet's orientation implies

1 if 1- 0
f,( + 1)+f,( -1) - { 0 if 1,,0.

(36)

p(+1Ia,S) - ..!.(/3.H+1)

(37)

Equations (34) and (36) together imply
2

and this clearly violates the probability bound o~ p ~ 1 whenever

IHI>~.
/3

(38)

In this form of the proof, it is clear that not only are locality and separability assumed, but also that there
is a joint probability function for al/ three cartesian components of the spin vectors. It is this last feature
of the proof which is responsible for the violation of the Bell inequality, and this assumption is a feature
of OM which is present at the outset, for OM requires that probabilities such as
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(39)

p(S·a- a&S·b- b) ,

when the vectors a and b are not parallel, are incompatible. Thus, the proof cannot proceed even beyond
the first step. Therefore, it is clear that the Bell inequalities have nothing to do with non-locality or
"spooky" action at distance. All that OM specifies are "transition" probabilities of the form

p(S'a - xIS'b - y),

(40)

and these are specifiable regardless of the unit vectors a and b. Finally, we should note that equation
(40) is consistent with the disturbance model for measurements. When an electron's spin direction is
measured in a sequence of measurements along linearly independent directions, the spin is unavoidably
altered to align along the measured directions.

Suppes-Zanotti and Wigner-Holt derivations
The Suppes-Zanotti proof is a pure probabilistic theoretical derivation. It assumes nothing about physical
processes which give rise to the random variables. In particular, it mentions nothing about whether the
processes are local, separated in space and time, etc. Its only assumption is the existence of joint
probabilities for the random variables. Therefore, it is clear that locality plays no essential part in the
derivation of the inequality. I now proceed to give an expanded outline of the proof as given in [37].
Denote by X,V and Z three random variables with zero means and outcomes in the set {-1 , + 1}. Denote
by p(x,y,z) the probability of the specific outcome X=x, V=y and Z=z. Further, assume that the values
of the three expectations, E(xy), E(XZ) and E(YZ) are given. It should be noted that the values for these
expectations cannot be arbitrarily assigned. First, it is clear that they must all be bounded by constraints
such as: -1 :5 E(XY) :5 1. Second, it is impossible that E(XY) = E(XZ) = E(YZ) = -1 . There is no
assignment of probabilities which can realize this. The first equality requires both V and Z to be the
negative of X and thus to be equal, and this contradicts the last equality that V and Z must be anticorrelated.
There are eight independent values of the probabilities p(x,y,z) to be specified for the values of X= ± 1,
V = ± 1, Z= ± 1. The three correlations plus the three means and the requirement that the probabilities
sum to one then yield a system of seven equations for the eight unknown probabilities, namely

L p(x,y,z) - 1 ,
xyz

L xp(x,y,z) - E(X) - O ,

Lyp(x,y,z) - E(y) - O,

L zp(x,y,z) - E(z) - O ,

xyz

xyz

xyz

L xzp(x,y,z) - E(XZ) ,

Lyzp(x,y,z) - E(YZ) ,

L xYP(x,y,z) - E(xy)

xyz

xyz

xyz

(41)

.

The requirement that the arbitrarily selected eighth probability, say p(+1 ,+1,+1), satisfies the probability
bound
(42)
then yields a constraint on the correlations
-1 <;; E(XY) + E(Y2) + E(XZ) <;; 1 +2min(E(xy),E(Y2),E(XZ)).

(43)

This equation can be rewritten as four separate, independent equations obtained by considering three out
of a larger set of four random variables, say w,x,y, and z. One equation involves {x,y,z}, another {w,y,z},
etc. Combining these four equations then yields eq.(23). It should be noted that in this form , the proof
requires a jOint probability function for measurements performed on the same particle.
The Wigner-Holt proof is essentially the same as the Suppes-Zanotti proof. Rather than considering the
eight values of the joint probability function of three random variables, it looks at the sixteen values of the
joint probabilities of the four results a,a',b,b'; results a and a' at detector A using the settings eAand eA"
and results band b' at detector B using the settings s and B" The proof then proceeds along similar
lines, assuming only a joint probability function; but it assumes a joint probability function for four
counterfactual events. For example, a given probability value

e
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e

p(a- + 1,a'- +1,b- +1,b'- +1)

(44)

gives a putative probability that we will measure all four values as + 1. But it is impossible to empirically
obtain a result at detector A with a given setting and empirically pair it with results at detector B,
supposing the run had been made with different settings.
To reiterate and summarize: Each of these proofs of the Bell inequalities assumes progressively less, and
it thus becomes clear that the common ingredient of all the proofs is the existence of a joint probability
function. This is emphasized by the Suppes-Zanotti derivation whose only assumption is the existence
of a jOint probability distribution. It makes no assumptions regarding the physics such as locality, finite
speed of light, or separability. The Suppes-Zanotti theorem states that the sole necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a joint probability density is the existence of Bell-like inequalities. Both the
Aspect experiment and the theoretical prediction of quantum mechanics violate the Bell inequalities. We
thus deduce that there is no joint probability function which can generate the putative four correlations

GAB GA'B GAB' GA'B'.

(45)

But, we already knew this! Since the components of spin are non-commuting observables, they are also
not simultaneously measurable. The empirical results of the Aspect experiment say nothing more than that
the experiment is measuring incommensurate quantities. This is all we can conclude - it does not imply
non-locality, action-at-a-distance, mental telepathy, solipsism, or any of the other claims of expositors of
the "mysteries of quantum mechanics" as revealed by the Aspect experiments".
As for incommensurate quantities, they are not limited to quantum mechanical systems. There are many
examples of pairs (x,Y) of classical or macroscopic "random" variables for which a joint probability p(x,Y)
does not exist. Recall that p(x,y) represents the probability that both events x and yare realized and are
pairable in an unambiguous way. One example of a non-quantum system for which joint probabilities do
not exist is the singular probability for lifetimes of light bulbs which are run at different specified voltages.
For instance, let the variable x represent the event, ''the light bulb lifetime :;; x when operated at a
constant voltage of 60 volts," and y represent the event, ''the light bulb lifetime:;; y when operated at 120
volts." It is clear that there is no joint probability for this set of events. A light bulb, under the specification
of the experiment, cannot have two lifetimes at two different voltages. The measurement of the lifetime
at 60 volts precludes the measurement of its lifetime at 120 volts - and this type of situation is included
in the more general case where the measurement of one quantity disturbs the value of the other quantity
for which a joint probability is to be determined. So, any pair of events (x,y) which are incompatible in
the sense that they cannot coexist (such as the lifetimes of light bulbs obeying classical physics, or
conjugate variables such as independent spin components of an electron in quantum mechanics) will
result in the impossibility of a joint probability function - and this, in turn, is a necessary condition for a
possible violation of Bell's inequalities.
This observation - that the central feature leading to the violation of the Bell inequalities was not any of
the traditional assumptions of locality or causality, but rather the absence of joint measurability - leads
to the possibility of classical systems also exhibiting violations of the inequality, and indeed classical
systems have been found which violate Bell's inequalities. These are mentioned by Brody in several of
his articles (of. [9, pp.217,236]) , and I refer the reader to the original literature [25], [36] where some of
these classical systems are described.
A Christian realist interpretation

Based upon the prior discussion, we can begin to construct a Christian realist interpretation. This
interpretation is built upon the features of the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation, the ensemble interpretation
and relativistic quantum field theory (aFT) which are consistent with Christian theism. In summary, the
features of a Christian theistic interpretation are as follows: First, CI-1 is rejected. Instead, along the lines
of the deBroglie-Bohm and aFT, the wave function is a real physical wave. This wave never collapses.
Thus, we can account for the observed interference patterns in a rational but incomplete manner.
Second, aM is incomplete and there never will be a complete description. (There may be replacements
for aM which are richer and are covering theories for aM, but those theories will also be incomplete.)
Third, measurements always result in a disturbance of a physical system in an inscrutable manner, such
that incommensurate (i.e. conjugate observables) cannot be simultaneously predicted or controlled. The
wave function of aM represents the limits of humanly attainable knowledge and control of physical
systems. Preparation of a physical system in a state, followed by measurements of incompatible
observables, A, B, etc., always results in unpredictable outcomes determined by God. The state is not
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a sufficient causal predecessor of the observed effects. The "acausal" collapse assumption (CI-2) is not
acausal, but rather unpredictable. In this sense, CI-2 is really an epistemological construct, similar to
Bayesian conditionalization.
Remember that "unpredictable" is not a synonym for "uncaused."
Consequently, particle trajectories are continuous but cannot be exhaustively determined by man, and
are thus unpredictable.
SUMMARY

The conclusions of these discussions are the following: First, the usual interpretations of the CI in terms
of anti-theistic metaphysical assumptions are not a necessary consequence of the OM formalism, but are
the result of the additional assumptions of CI added to OM. The outlandish claims of paranormal
phenomena, due to misinterpretations of Bell inequalities, are unwarranted. Second, when purged of the
anti-theistic assumptions, the experimental results and theoretical predictions are consistent with Christian
theism. Third, a Biblically based Christian theism actually reveals a OM-like limitation on man's
knowledge. The necessary incompleteness of aM, in particular, and all physical theories, in general, is
known from special revelation. Further, the theory of OM implies absence of physical causalism (not
causation in general) and epistemological limits on man - the exact presuppositions of Christian theism.
OM does not deny ultimate causation by God. Therefore, OM is, in fact, consistent with the revealed truth
of God controlling all things! Rather than revealing a "God of the gaps," quantum mechanics is consistent
with the fact that there are no gaps for God to fill, for, in fact, God fills al/ in al/.
A CRITIQUE OF "COMMON SENSE SCIENCE"

Before I begin my critique of "Common Sense Science," (hereafter CSS) I wish to state that the men in
this organization say much with which I agree, in principle. The points of agreement are:
1. The foundational authority of Scripture;
2. The criterion of the superiority of "covering theories." That is, first, if theory A, using fewer
primitive notions, can explain some unexplained feature of (an accepted) theory B; and,
second, if theory A explains all other features of theory B, then theory A is the superior and
preferred theory. (This principle can be established from Scripture, but to do so is beyond
the scope of this essay. It should also be stated that this criterion says nothing about the
possibility of, or requirement that, such covering theories exist.)
However, CSS rather than grounding their critique and rejection of OM and relativity solely upon Biblical
principles, goes on to invoke other abstract principles as reasons to reject quantum mechanics and the
theories of relativity. These prinCiples are, primarily: (1) "common sense," (2) "Mach's criterion," and (3)
rejection of "idealizations." In regard to idealizations, there is the further criticism of the "point particle
approximation," and a distinction between "mathematical" models as opposed to "physical" models. Also
impliCit in some of the argumentation is an appeal to physical causalism - though this appeal seems to
be invoked more as an objection to the irrational acausalism expounded by the radical proponents of the
Copenhagen interpretation. Before I proceed, let me say that I am not suggesting that the members of
CSS are self-consciously appealing to principles that are Thomistic or Arminian. However, to the extent
that they do adopt the premises and the consequences of those schools of thought, they are not using
a conSistently scripturally based theistic apologetic. It is the approach of appealing to these non-theistic
"principles" with which I disagree.
In addition to disagreement on these foundational approaches, there are a number of technical areas of
disagreement which space does not allow to be covered here. But one technical issue which I will
discuss is the question of stability of Bergman's classical electromagnetic ring model of elementary
particles (ct. e.g. Bergman [6], Bergman and Wesley [5]).
Appeals to "common sense" and Mach's criterion

To begin, we will first consider the appeals to "common sense" and Mach's criterion (cf. [4]). These
criteria are appeals to authority. To state the question succinctly: To whom or what can Common Sense
Science appeal to justify the authority of "common sense" and "Mach's criterion?"
Consider first the appeal to "common sense." Though this appeal is primarily to "establish" the existence
of "objective reality," CSS admits this is an assumption and unprovable, yet reasonable. As CSS states
in their web pages [12]: "Common Sense Science is based on three unprovable but reasonable
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assumptions: "Reality ... Causality . .. Unity .. .." This admission is the result of abandoning a
thoroughly theistic presuppositional approach to all knowledge. CSS - rather than building a foundation
from the start on the presupposition of God - instead starts by building a foundation upon abstract
principles. To admit that the assumptions are unprovable is a concession which will make the resolute
skeptic smile, as he could ask for nothing more than this! It concedes the central presupposition of
skepticism, which states that in the realm of knowledge, nothing is certain. Also, the statement that these
assumptions are "reasonable" is to beg the question - whether they are "reasonable" is the precise issue
which the resolute skeptic will want verified by "laws of logic" which he will accept.
"Common sense" is not the answer to David Hume's devastating arguments against realism (which are
unanswerable on anything but Biblically based Christian theism, and this defended presuppositionally).
Further, though I grant that an initially unproven "assumption" is permissible as a proximate starting point
in any argumentation, yet, the fact that there is an objective reality is not unprovable since there is an
ultimate and absolute starting point, namely, God. The proof of the existence of objective reality is as
certain as the existence of God - for there is an absolutely certain proof of God's existence. In a nut
shell, the ''transcendental'' proof of God's existence is: "God exists because of the impossibility of the
contrary," (ct. Van Til [39, pp.100-1],[40, pp.205-6,222-3]). The approach of CSS is an example of the
Thomistic approach of appealing to abstract principles first, then, after the fact, discussing the "possibility"
or "probability" of God's existence - as if, without God, there could be a reality, causality, and unity, and,
we should mention, rationality and the immaterial laws of logic. (The point is: Reality, causality, and unity
in the created realm are derivative from God, and they are intelligible only on the presupposition of the
God of Christian theism.) A God that just "possibly" exists is not the God of Scripture. Such a "god" is
one whose "possible" existence rests upon neutral, independent laws of thought and abstract principles
which are apparently rooted "in a vacuum." This is an unacceptable approach to defending the faith.
Appeal to principles that are rooted "in a vacuum" is unintelligible and places one on anti-theistic ground.
The laws of logic do not rest "in a vacuum" or in "neutral territory" between the anti-theist and theist
"camps." There is no ''vacuum .'' All of reality is in the theist "camp," and this includes the abstract laws
of logic. The laws of logic are constituted in man's rationality in accordance with his being created in
imago Dei. The laws of logic as placed in man are rooted in God and are thus reflective of God's
rationality. Therefore, we conclude that the "reasonableness" to which CSS appeals is provable - but
only on the presupposition of the God of Christian theism.
We should also note that the appeal to "common sense" in any argument is a double-edged sword, and
one risks being thrown by his own petard when employing it. To the extent that "common sense" is
intended to mean "rational" (in the Christian theistic sense that man can attain to a rational but nonexhaustive understanding of God and creation) , the view can be supported by Scripture, as presented
in Part I. But in this case, the appeal then becomes an appeal to the correct foundation, namely, the
Scriptures, and not to "common sense." On the negative side, once one has appealed to "common
sense," the question arises as to when to limit its "authority." To what higher principle do we appeal to
limit common sense only to the question of objective reality and not other issues? In fact, an unlimited
appeal to common sense was the universal principle of the era of Enlightenment - "enlightened common
sense" was the ultimate judge of truth. The fruit of this philosophy was the promulgation of deistic
philosophy, such as that espoused, for example, by Thomas Jefferson". In the case of Jefferson, he
believed that Reason was sufficient to judge that the Hebrew scriptures were not God's special revelation,
and he thereby rejected the Hebrew scriptures. Similarly, he rejected the deity of Christ, miracles, and
the Trinity. Jefferson called his religious beliefs "rational Christianity." We thus see, in this regard, that
if one is intent on retaining a belief in inspired special revelation but also an appeal to common sense,
one must adopt the Thomistic notion of two realms and methods of knowledge - reason which
adjudicates truth in the natural sphere, and faith (not subject to "common sense") which adjudicates truth
where reason must be curbed.
Next, consider the appeal to "Mach's criterion," which as quoted in [4], is: "Only those propositions should
be employed in physical theory from which statements about observable phenomena can be deduced."
Mach's criterion is clearly the first principle of logical positivism. E. Mach, generally considered to be the
As a radical
father of the seminal idea of logical positivism, held to a bare phenomenalism.
phenomenologist, Mach attempted to exorcise all "metaphYSics" from science. On one hand, Mach's
extreme phenomenology led him to embrace a form of idealism" and a form of a static Parmenidean
world in which nothing really happens, in fact, a world in which there is no cause and effect. To quote
Mach himself [20]: ''There is no cause and effect in nature; nature has but an individual existence; nature
simply is. Recurrences of like cases exist only in the abstraction which we perform for the purpose of
mentally reproducing the facts."
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Inherent in Mach's view, as embodied in the "criterion," is the idea that all knowledge is "scientific" and
can only be discovered and judged through "sense phenomena" via the "operationalism" of the "scientific
method." As a result of this outlook, theological statements were not even considered to be false, just
meaningless, (i.e. theology is "metaphysical" in the pejorative sense). As Gordon H. Clark [10, p.199]
rightly observes in referring to Laplace, Haeckel and Mach: "... all ... in one way or another construct
a worldview that makes theism impossible." Mach, 'the scientific skeptic," is not the "authority" to appeal
to when building a consistently theistic worldview.
The appeal of CSS to Mach's criterion is also a relapse into the appeal to an abstract principle in
accordance with the rationalism of Thomistic and Arminian thought which accords autonomy to man. It
is important to note that Lucas repeatedly uses Mach's criterion as the standard to judge that various
modern theories are "non-scientific," (ct. [22, e.g. pp.21,27, etc.]). First, we should note that this is an
acceptance of the idea that there is a compartment of knowledge disjoint from theology and other
knowledge, in general, that can be termed "scientific." As pointed out in Part I, this distinction is rooted
in Thomism and is not theistic. Second, for the sake of argument, if we suppose that there is a class of
"scientific" facts and knowledge, we can ask the question: Is Mach's criterion itself "scientific?" The
answer, according to the criteria of its own standard, is "no!" Mach's criterion cannot be found written on
a rock or seen through a microscope. This is the Achilles heel of Mach's worldview and of logical
positivism - by its own declaration it is meaningless. This brings us once again to the conclusion that
there is only one method for judging the truth of physical theories, namely: Are they consistent with
Christian theism as revealed in Scripture?
Mechanism and reductionism

Other parts of the CSS approach are direct appeals to mechanistic explanation. To see this strain in some
of the writings of Lucas, consider the following quote [22, p.7]:
"... to allow identifications of mechanisms in agreement with scripture by which God could
create the universe, daily sustain it in the most minute detail, and perform miracles." (emph.
added)
I certainly agree with Lucas in his desire to develop a Christian philosophy of science, and again to
subordinate science to special revelation so that it is "in agreement with Scripture." However, the desire
to identify a mechanism is reductionistic and mechanistic. For example, a similar argument could be
made in the case of the nature of man, with the aim to identify mechanisms of "will" and "mind." But such
a program would place one dangerously close to "behaviorism." This desire to find mechanisms is an
appeal to the very same principle which undergirds the atheistic worldview which Lucas rightly condemns.
And that principle is the search for naturalistic and exhaustive knowledge within creation. In the defense
of Christian theism no such explanation is wanted. We would, of course, point out that the theistic
doctrine of creation explicitly denies the possibility of a mechanism by which God could create. The
creation is a miracle performed by divine fiat; the secret of the creation lies within God. Scripture itself
declares that, by Christ "all things consist" (Col. 1: 17); and that He upholds "all things by the word of his
power," (Heb. 1:3). Scripture provides no more than this and does not include descriptions of
"mechanisms" as to "how" God does this. As God manifests Himself and interacts with the creation whether He does so within the bounds of the physical laws which He has created, or suspends them all is within His power. Even assuming we could trace back in time all of the physical mechanisms and
make infinitely preCise measurements of all events which contribute to a coin landing "heads," we know
from Scripture that this is still an incomplete description - mechanistic causalism alone does not
determine the result! It is in the nature of the case that no mechanism will ever be found. Scripture states
that the result is "of the Lord." The continual and omnipresent providence of God, acting both directly and
indirectly through the physical laws which He has established, determines the result.
Retreat to mechanistic causality

Lucas and Bergman, rather than rejecting the confusion of modern atheistic physiCists of causality with
predictability, accept this claim at face value and then on this basis reject quantum mechanics. Lucas
states [22, p.34]: "Within the context of the wave equation one has a purely statistical interpretation of
nature in which the notions of causality are essentially lost." Bergman [3] states, "In the classical theory
of science, there is an underlying assumption that events follow the law of cause and effect. Events do
not occur at random or spontaneously, but are the result of some cause." I agree with this assessment,
that all physical effects have a cause, but the choice is not between physical causation and no causation
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at al/. Rather, as argued in Part I, not al/ causes are open to the scrutiny of man - God is the ultimate
cause of all things, and the whole being of God is not communicable unto man. The Copenhagen
interpretation in its radical embracing of ultimate indeterminism is at fault, but this is not a necessalY
requirement of quantum mechanics. Thus, these arguments for rejecting OM are un persuasive.
Rejection of certain idealizations

Lucas [22, p.14) states, "Many of the problems with modern science stem from the use of idealizations .
. .," of which he identifies and singles ou1 the point particle idealization as the most significant. It is
important to emphasize that the point particle idealization is really only an approximation, and, as such,
it is rou1inely employed not only in modern physics but also classical applications, relativistic applications,
and quantum mechanical applications. We should also add that relativity is not founded on the point
particle approximation, as Lucas states. Extended and composite bodies are and were rou1inely
employed in the development of classical charged particle models, as a literature search will readily reveal.
The same comments apply to OM and OFT. Models of many-particle bound states are not antithetical
to aM, and the discovery of neutron and proton structure did not come as a "shock" to the physics
community. Nor would the discovery of "Iepto-quarks" and a discovery of internal electron structure.
Such a discovery would only move the question of "point" particles and their stability to another level.
It is true that a point electron model is afflicted with the problem of infinite self-energy, and that it is
unstable if it is viewed and modeled as an extended body of divisible electric fluid. But the question is
why must it be an extended body of divisible electric fluid? Could it not be an irreducible (i.e. atomos)
object, held together by Christ? The Biblical answer is: Yes, it could, for by Christ al/ things hold together.
On the other hand, the atheist would embrace with relish the discovery of a consistent and purely physical
stable model of the electron. (It should be added, that such a putative discovery is, of course, an
impossibility as Col. 1:17 attests.) Such a putative model would be viewed as a confirmation of the atheist
worldview - as for God, the atheist has no need of that hypothesis, for then the electron consists in itself.
Lucas identifies certain idealizations as ultimately false. He states [22, p.9), "From the Christian
perspective it is important to know ... what sort of conclusions science comes to as a result of using
these idealizations." The anti-theistic worldview does not come at the end of a syllogism starting with an
antecedent assumption of the point particle idealization. Rather, the worldview is the presupposition.
And, as pointed out in Part I, man's knowledge is always analogical and idealized due to his finite
creatureliness. The arguments Lucas espouses for rejecting certain idealizations are not persuasive, since
the conclusions he draws are not necessary inferences of the specifically identified idealizations.
Distinction between "mathematical" and "physical" models

Another point which is puzzling is the appeal to a distinction between physical models as opposed to
mathematical models. Yet, it is unclear in what sense Bergman's models are less "mathematical." Even
Bergman's "physical" models are expressed in mathematical language and are thus idealized descriptions
of physically measurable quantities. Bergman's ring model consists of an idealized torus consisting of
what is essentially a distribution of "electric fluid." This leads one to the familiar dilemma of reductionism:
What is this electric fluid? Is it a continuum? (This too is a mathematical idealization). Or, is it really an
aggregate of more fundamental particles? And if so, are they points? This is an infinite regress.
I agree that the Copenhagen interpretation of the wave function as an abstract probability wave
approaches the sense of "mathematical" (abstract with no connection to physical reality), to which
Bergman objects. Bu1 when examined closer, we find that Bergman's argument - though I believe valid
in intent - is not as strong as it may seem at first examination. As related above, the problem, and, in
fact, the nonsensical portion of the CI, is the raising of an abstract wave function (in a Hilbert space's)
to the level of physical ontological probability or ultimate chance. To see that the argument based on
abstraction alone is not valid, we need only one counterexample. As a counterexample, we need only
note that classical probability theory uses abstract mathematics to describe epistemological states or
degrees of knowledge. Such mathematical expressions for degrees of belief, statistics, etc., are used in
essentially the same sense as the wave function of OM. Both are mathematical expressions of states of
mind. Theistically, mind is both real and immaterial. Thus, probabilistic descriptions (theistically
understood) - inasmuch as they are descriptive of our mental states of knowledge - are necessarily
abstract, for they do not correspond exactly to the outcomes determined by God. A more concrete
counterexample from classical physics is the distribution function, f(x,v), of classical statistical mechanics.
It is purely mathematical, and it bears a similar relation to the wave function in the ensemble interpretation.
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Further, f(x,v) is an epistemological construct, and to the extent that it describes ontology, it describes
idealized group behaviors and degrees of ignorance.
We should also note that the electric and magnetic fields of classical electrodynamics provide an example
of a similar metamorphosis from abstract concept to ontological existence. At one time the physical
existence of such ''field'' concepts was not part of "common sense." It has since become part of the
standard scientific "orthodox" doctrine to "reity" the electric and magnetic fields, though being vector fields
they are to be pictured mathematically as arrays of numbers attached at each point of space. These
numbers then came to be pictured as tiny "vector fields" which indicate "directions" at each point in
space'6. But the question is: "A direction in what?" A direction is a displacement in space, while an
electric field, on the other hand, is not a distance in space since it has units of "volts/m"; and when
multiplied by charge ("coulombs") yields the direction of a force, which also does not "reside" in space.
The field and the force are not the same thing. Where does this force reside? It certainly is not a vector
attached to the particle and extending so many meters in physical space. This force can, in turn, be
converted to acceleration and be integrated to obtain velocities and, finally, positions in space. Thus, we
ultimately come to the visualizable kinematics. Through this conceptual manipulation of mathematical
concepts we come to the illusion of explanation - but closer scrutiny reveals mere description. The
question remains : What are the electric and magnetic fields?17 Though the well-known arrangement of
iron filings under the influence of magnets does lead one to acquiesce to this concept of a field , yet even
in this circumstance we can ask - as Mach asked Boltzmann concerning the atom - "Have you seen
one?" What one sees in actuality is only the action of the magnet on the filings. So if we are really
pressed to describe this field - for example, if we ask the question, "Of what 'stuff' is it composed"'·
- we find that further explanation (or "reduction") is hard to find. In this case, it is well to remember the
initial resistance to Newton's gravitational action at a distance, which was called an "occult force" since
it was not "action by contact."
A TECHNICAL REMARK ON BERGMAN'S SPINNING RING MODEL

This model is proposed as a replacement to quantum mechanics, in part motivated by a desire to
eliminate the model of the electron as a point particle. Though I believe that the prior portions of this
paper have demonstrated that the methodological foundations of CSS's rejection of quantum mechanics
are unjustified, I do want to address a technical problem in the spinning ring model. This difficulty centers
on the claim that the ring model is stable.
Is the Bergman ring model stable?

Bergman and Wesley [5] claim their physical model of the electron (and other elementary particles) is
"completely stable under electromagnetic forces alone." I will show that this claim is incorrect, using
Bergman's own stated formula for the total energy of the ring.
Recall that if we have a configuration of matter for which we can write its energy, U, as a function of
generalized coordinates q' as:
(46)
U-U(q1, .. ,qn),
then the generalized force acting to change coordinate q' is given by
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and the configuration is stable only if there is a point such that the force vanishes, and such that U is a
minimum, i.e.

a2u >0 .

(48)
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For the Bergman model (ct. Equation (6) of [6]), the energy is given by (q is the particle's charge)
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Computing the generalized forces gives
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This equation does admit a zero at (note here e is the base of natural logarithms)
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but this value is outside the range of Bergman's approximation (R»r). For R»r the force is repulsive
and causes an increase in R
The force for the r coordinate is
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This force is repulsive and has no zero except at r=+oo, and thus, the ring explodes, since the forces act
to increase both rand R
CONCLUSION

In summary, the Christian theistic philosophy of science, which is Biblically based, includes the following
truths. First, man is finite. Man is a created being, and he cannot exhaustively penetrate God's creation.
Second, though man is finite, he is nevertheless created in the image of God, and what he can know he
can know truly. OM is consistent with this Biblically based epistemology. Thus, the claims of modern
science - when they describe the discovery of a world in which there are limits to man's knowledge
(such as those found in quantum mechanics and relativity) - pose no threat to Christianity and the
doctrines of God and of creation and of man. However, when the anti-theistic philosophies of some
modern physicists are invalidly added to explain the phenomenon modeled by quantum mechanics (or
when theories such as relativity are irresponsibly and falsely applied to sociology to argue for ethical
relativism), we must be prepared to rebut. Our rebuttal needs to carefully separate observations and
theory from the presupposed anti-theistic worldview and must concentrate only upon the anti-theistic
claims. I hope this essay has provided some intellectual ammunition for the apologetic warfare in which
we as Christians and scientists are engaged.

END NOTES:

1. This last statement usually elicits the question: "Are you suggesting that unbelievers cannot discover
truth or do science using their methods?" The answer is simply no. First, the noetic effect of sin on
unbelievers is a moral and ethical alienation from God; sin has not reduced man to an irrational beast;
the unbeliever is still the imago Dei. Unbelievers plow their fields similarly to believers, but, "even the
plowing of the wicked is sin," (Prov. 21 :4, KJV). Second, the unbelieving scientist can discover truth in
spite of his worldview, because the methods of science are actually based upon and presuppose the
Christian view of truth. Therefore, the unbeliever can successfully engage in science because he is not
consistent. His methodology, stolen from Christianity, is not consistent with and cannot be established
by his avowed worldview. See Van Til [39, p.103].
2. The normative hermeneutic is characterized by the following rules for assigning the meaning of a
passage: "Unless the context of the passage or parallel passage requires otherwise, the standard usage
of a word, phrase, grammatical construction, figure of speech, etc. prevails." For further details ct. RE.
Walsh [42].
3. Incidentally, the selection of Matthias by lot (Acts 1:26) was not a mistake on the part of the eleven.
The twelfth apostle had to be one who had been present throughout the Lord's earthly ministry (Acts 1:2126), as he was required to be one of the rulers of the tweive tribes of Israel (Matt. 19:28). Moreover, the
casting of lots was the correct, God-ordained, priestly procedure for the eleven to use. The conclusion
is that the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb written on the foundations of the New Jerusalem
include Matthias, not Paul! The apostle Paul, on the other hand, is the special channel through whom
Christ directly revealed (Gal. 1: 11-12) the dispensation of the mystery (Eph. 3:3-5; Rom. 16:25-26; and Col.
1:26) or Body of Christ program. Paul is not a member of the Jewish dispensation.
4. We should note that this verse includes both Greek words which are rendered ''will'' in English
translations. Boulomai - the word which expresses deliberative will (to decree or execute counsel) and
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thelo - the word which expresses the desire. This verse emphatically teaches the doctrine of the unity of
God's will of decree and desire. God decrees (boulomai) exactly that which He desires (thelo), and He
also accomplishes (energeo) it. Further, since Scripture centers "desire" in the person of the Father, and
"decree" in the person of the Son (who, as the Logos, is the "word" or articulator of the Father's desire),
and the working of the desire as decreed in the Spirit, this verse includes all three persons of the
ontological Trinity in their relation to the creation. This verse thus also shows that those who hold to a
modified Calvinism (Amyraldianism), by rejecting particular redemption by the Son while paying lip service
to particular election by the Father, have a defective view of God. They are not truly trinitarian, since they
make a division between the Father and the Son. Scripture clearly teaches that the Father and the Son
are one, in essence and purpose, and that Christ came to do the Father's will (desire), that is to die in the
place of (an actual substitutionary atonement) and to save only the elect (ct. e.g. John 10:11 with 10:26;
and Rom . 8:32) . The "age old" arguments against particular redemption have been answered ably by
John Owen in his work The Death of Death in the Death of Christ [26), to which I refer the interested
reader.
5. We should point out in connection with these Biblical testimonies, that the presence of sin in the
universe is inconsistent with the Arminian's non-Scriptural axiom of '1ree" will and the plan of God. To see
this, consider the following argument from Van Til [40, p.83). Either the sin of Adam was or was not within
the plan of God. If it was, then there is an inconsistency with the Arminian's "axiom" of free will; for
Adam 's choice was free (i.e. not necessary), yet certain according to the plan of God. The alternative is
that sin was not within the plan of God, and thus it was beyond the control of God. And this puts one
on anti-theistic ground. The correct Biblical view is that man is a free agent; man is responsible and does
choose according to his nature, yet every choice is within God's plan (determinate counsel) .
6. Along this line, as Christian theists, we insist that the prophets of God could, Deus volens, predict the
results of a long string of die rolls. (This hypothetical example is meant to be illustrative of a principle and
is not meant to trivialize the prophetic office by discussing what might appear at first inspection to be a
"inconsequential" activity - though in the broader scheme of God's overarching plan, the occurrence of
such an experiment would serve the purpose to corroborate a prophet as from God.) But we must not
say that God intervenes to "alter" die rolls in an otherwise contingent universe (such is a deistic view), or
that God just communicates his prescience of otherwise contingent die rolls to his prophets; but rather,
God communicates the results of the die rolls to his prophets because the die rolls are determined by
God according to His complete and all-encompassing plan for creation. That is, God controls all
sequences of events which creatureward appear as contingent events. God controls all things,
whatsoever comes to pass. There is no ultimate contingency; all possibilities are rooted in God who is
behind all of creation.
7. According to the extreme reductionist - for whom there is no such thing as "mind" but only "brains"
(composed in turn of matter in motion) - there is a given state X which corresponds to Beethoven
'1hinking" and "writing" the first note of his first symphony. For the determinist, the second note was a
necessary consequence of the first note; thus, Beethoven is a mechanical automaton. For the
indeterministic reductionist, the second note is not a necessary consequence, but is the result of reified
Chance. So in this case, though the anti-theistic philosophies of modern physics may have freed man
from the tyranny of eternal impersonal necessity of Laplace's clockwork universe, the '1reedom" it has to
offer is thralldom to ultimate eternal irrational chaos. In either case, there is no "Beethoven" who is a real
individual personality and a responsible free agent, as Christian theism asserts. Instead, "Beethoven" is
a "zombie," a complex mass of (determined or undetermined) "behaviors" which are the mechanical
reactions to other "behaviors." Thus, there are no such things as rationality, laws of logic, intelligibility,
ethics, etc. Again, we see that in the atheist worldview everything is "sound and fury signifying nothing."
8. Excursus on mind-body problem. Equation (5) is similar to that which we must write when considering
the nature of man . Man has volition, and as a result of our mental activity and wills, we exercise control
over the material realm - in particular our brains and bodies. Yet, we are aware of the fact that our
material bodies really are not "us." In fact, we know that the actual matter of our bodies has been
replaced many times over in the course of our lives, so that there is no particular assemblage of matter
which is "us." The biblical doctrine is that the real self is the immaterial soul and spirit. We are also
aware that our material bodies also obey the laws of physics; for example, our involuntary response to
the laws of inertia as we fall, or involuntary reflexes when we are acutely aware that our leg moves though
we did not "will it." At any rate, it is the exercise of our wills over our bodies which is one aspect of the
mind-body problem. Similar to equation (5) above we have for our case:
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where v("mind") is a term which expresses the physical forces manifested in our bodies as a result of our
mental agency. The term v cannot be reduced to physical law, and it is apparent that Newton's third law
of motion cannot be invoked as a back reaction of v on "mind." It is interesting that this equation is
analogous to God's providential term in eq. (5) - I would suggest that this is another example of our
being the imago Dei.
9. The limitation to a denumerable set of events is arbitrary and is selected merely for notational
convenience. The argument can be easily generalized to included continuous events.
10. The purely additive effect which should be the case for a particle can be made more exact by
considering the following: Suppose the particle's path is random as to which hole it passes through. Let
P(A) and P(B) be the probabilities that the particle passes through slit A and B, respectively. Let P(ylx)
be the probability that the particle strikes the screen at point y given it passes through slit X E {A,B}.
Then, based on the standard formula for conditional probability, the probability, P(S) , that the particle
arrives at S, if both slits are open, is given by:
p(s) - p(SIA)p(A) +P(S IB)P(B)

This formula is clearly the sum of the number of particles arriving from either slit and, thus, does not
exhibit the observed interference. Note this expression is denoted as 1,+1 2 in Figure 1.
11. Mathematically aM implies that the coordinates of trajectories, considered as functions of time, are
in the class of C,· functions .
12. It should be explicitly stated and emphasized that Christian theism need not be committed to the
axiom of locality. Since God is omnipresent, He can act non locally, simultaneously and instantaneously;
and it is conceivable that He has arranged the natural order such that even the conservation laws explicitly
(through non-locality) manifest His providential upholding of creation. However, I want to emphasize again
that the logical structure of the proofs of Bell's inequalities do not require non-locality. Thus, those forms
of the discussion which introduce spatially separated correlated systems, which seem to imply superluminal action-at-a-distance, actually obscure a more fundamental mystery. This fundamental mystery is
that a single localized electron cannot be described as having a spin vector in R3 (consisting of three welldefined projections on the Cartesian axes)! This is the case even before the particles of a spin-correlated
system have been spatially separated. We can say that an electron has a probability distribution for a
single spin component Sz' but not one for Sx and Sy and Sz. This, in itself, is baffling, since it means we
cannot visualize the electron as a spinning geometrical object embedded in R3. On the other hand, we
can think of the spin operator - which represents measurements on the spin object - as three
dimensional (since this is how we construct Stern-Gerlach magnets, for example). I would like to thank
the anonymous referee whose comment on non-locality suggested this additional endnote.
13. Two good references on the religious views of Thomas Jefferson are Sanford [35] and Gaustad [16].
14. I have intentionally avoided calling Mach an "idealist." It is a characterization which Mach would have
denied. Nevertheless, Mach's view is, in essence, similar to Hume's idealism. When the consequences
of Mach's philosophy are explored, it must be admitted that Mach embraced a form of idealism. This has
been pointed out by Popper (ct. [30, Part I, Sect. 11, pp.88-91]). Mach's philosophy has been called
"neutral monism." The word 'neutral' means a (skeptical) indifference between realism and idealism, while
'monism' means that there is only one 'stuff' of the universe: sensations. The indifference between realism
and idealism is a result of the positivist's or phenomenologist's view that such labels are "metaphysical,"
not subject to test, and thus are meaningless. Whether the world is "real" or "ideal" is irrelevant in science.
To a "neutral monist" such concepts are not needed to construct operational theories. This underscores
why Mach is a strange ally for a Christian theist who must necessarily be a realist.
15. We should note the fact that though aM uses a Hilbert space to describe the physical phenomena,
that alone does not thereby make aM abstract - no more so than a Fourier transform of classical wave
motion into an ideal superposition of "elementary vibrations of infinite duration" makes classical
electrodynamics abstract.
16. The idea of tangent vectors is also an abstract (idealized but real and true!) concept as has been
clearly emphasized by modern developments in differential geometry. In rigorous developments of curved
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spaces, it is shown that tangent vectors do not "reside" in the manifold M (the "base space"), but actually
reside (especially as illustrated in the case of a curved manifold such as the two-dimensional surface of
the earth) in another space, T(M), called the tangent bundle of M. The usual concept of vectors in flat
spaces - such as three-dimensional Euclidean space E3 with its concept of "sliding vectors" - obscures
this fact by identifying a copy of each tangent space Tp {E3) with E3 itself. As pointed out in the main text,
on the basis of dimensional considerations, a velocity vector having dimensions of [LfTl cannot be added
to points which have dimensions [L]. As a result, a velocity vector cannot "reside" in E' but rather in a
copy of E3. As a practical application of these observations, note that in a (computer) graphics
representation of a fluid flow, velocity tangent vectors must be converted to a spatial displacement by
multiplying by a convenient time scale. The tip of the vector then represents where the flow would be if
unaccelerated during that time scale. But this is a counterfactual representation and an idealization which
only aids in understanding and visualization. Such a visualization is not false. To actually represent the
flow, one should view a movie of the flow. This underscores the fact that the very idea of derivatives is
an idealized concept expressed as abstract limits of differences of tangent vectors.
17. It is interesting to note that many nineteenth-century physicists spent a lot of energy trying to construct
fluid and mechanical analogies of Maxwell's equations. The goal was to reduce electrodynamics to the
familiar fluid and mechanical systems of the day. The mechanical versions used fantastic assemblages
of tiny wheels and elastic bands, while the fluid analogies, though prima facie more credible, were likewise
unsuccessful. In face of these insurmountable difficulties and failures of this reductionism, physicists
finally accepted the physical existence of Maxwellian fields as irreducible "stuff' of the physical universe.
The lesson to be drawn from this is that the "common sense" of one age can easily become the "myth"
of the next. Once again, this highlights the futility of basing the Christian apologetic on the "scientific fads"
of the age. Science is not a crutch which supports Christianity; rather, Christian theism is the foundation
on which science rests.
18. It was this realization that the electromagnetic tensor could be viewed as a convenient mathematical
description which lead to the Feynman-Wheeler "action at a distance" formulation of electrodynamics. The
E and B fields can be totally eliminated and the dynamics expressed entirely in terms of equations for the
dynamics of charge distributions under the influence of forces acting at a distance. If I am allowed to
speak in the point particle approximation, all we need are the initial data for the collection of charged
particles of charges qn located at points xn{t), ct. e.g. Rohrlich [34, p.194].
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